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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, the Internet hardly needs an introduction. It’s a place of commerce, 
community, and opportunity. It’s a place with its own etiquette, ethics, and geography. 
One history of the Internet might explore the technology and policy that brought the 
global network of networks into existence. The history I present in this thesis examines 
the Internet’s changing meaning and values. No single metaphor more singularly 
illustrates the successive stages of the Internet than the one associated with the myth of 
the American frontier. The frontier metaphor often accompanies the conquest and 
creation of new spaces. This thesis begins with the premise that Cold War military goals 
commanded the development of Internet technology while the culture of the science 
community influenced the social construction of the network. The purpose of this thesis 
is to link the stages of development of the Internet to specific uses of the myth of the 
American frontier in rhetoric. First, I argue that the Internet is a product of the 
organizational structure of the wartime Office of Science and Research Development, the 
process-oriented rhetoric in Vannevar Bush’s Science: The Endless Frontier, and 
Kennedy’s commitment to the New Frontier, and that the rhetoric reflected the 
expansionist goals of the administrations during World War II and the Cold War. Second, 
I argue our conception of the Internet is influenced by how the scientific community built 
and used it, which is not expansionist, but collaborative, open, and democratic. Third, I 
demonstrate how the history of basic science and subsequently the Internet is also rooted 
in geography, specifically the Western states. Finally, I argue that rhetoric in the 1990s 
changed from expansionist to defensive of the collaborative, democratic nature instilled 
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into the network by researchers in face of normalization and settlement by corporations 
and government regulation. I also point to specific instances in the 1990s and 2000s 
where conceptions of the more established Internet resemble a post-Romantic fear of a 
savage place.  
In each public address I examined, the presidents, activists, journalists, and even 
festival planners are mythmakers using the images from the old story of American 
westward expansion to develop a new story. They change the hero from pioneers to 
scientist, engineer, and researcher. They change the mythic universe from the Western 
states to research laboratories, and cyberspace. The myth is pliable. It can be a battle call 
for expansion into dangerous, unsettled territories or a plea to defend endangered spaces. 
In sum, the Frontier is exceptionally well suited as the metaphor for the Internet and basic 
science. The electronic frontier parallels the significant geographic spread and 
overarching cultural reach of the frontier in the myth of the American West. The Internet 
is also thought of as place of boundless opportunity. It’s also important to recognize that 
these views are habits of a mindset that looks at the American frontier positively. I’ll 
show in chapter 2 that the Frontier myth largely supplants the active extermination of 
Native people with “progress,” and ignores other groups marginalized in history, 
including women, immigrants, and Southerner blacks. Western historian Richard Slotkin 
wrote a three-part book series chronicling the destructive edge of the frontier. But, of 
course, the frontier is a story, “a sequence of actions, a modern myth that combines belief, 
a structure of reality, superhuman forces, a pattern of behavior, and ideal characters” 
(Stoeltje, 1987, p. 250). One people’s utopian frontier is another people’s genocidal 
nightmare. The frontier is problematic, but important in the examination of the physical, 
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economic, and cultural landscapes of the Internet. Why would the scientific community 
and the American public relate to a violent origin myth? Slotkin points out that the myth 
regenerates among generations, and comprises three basic elements (Slotkin, 2000): the 
hero, the universe, and the narrative. Slotkin (2000) suggests that hero and universe 
(pioneer and frontier) are much more readily abstracted as images than the narrative as a 
whole, allowing audiences to identify with and enter the mythic world. The narrative then 
defines the relationships, actions, values, and the morality of the universe. According to 
Slotkin (2000), when a mythmaker changes the relationship of the hero to the universe, it 
illustrates a structural change in the relationship of the man to the environment and 
culture. As Burke (1969) points out, myths are necessary social functions to create a 
sense of interrelationship that leads to common social ends. Examining individual 
invocations of the frontier metaphor in rhetoric lends itself to a theoretical framework 
that preserves receivers’ identification with the values and understanding of concepts 
communicated by the myth in its interpretation.   
Metaphors allow the audience to see the problem and solution, and know 
immediately how to interact with both. A popular Internet trope claims that “all words 
ever spoken by human beings” could be stored in about 5 exabytes of data – or 5 billion 
gigabytes. Examining common usage, the metaphor illustrates both the mind-boggling 
size of an exabyte and also the rapid growth of data creation in the information age. 
Google CEO Eric Schmidt often receives credit for the popularization of the metaphor. In 
2010, Schmidt addressed a convention audience claiming, “There were 5 exabytes of 
information created between the dawn of civilization through 2003, but that much 
information is now created every two days” (Schmidt, 2010). Bloggers covering the event 
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plastered the quote to their leads and headlines (Kirkpatrick 2010; Siegler 2010). Time 
magazine referenced Schmidt’s quote again in its 2011 article, “How Big is the Internet?” 
(McMillan 2011). Internet entrepreneur Eli Pariser galvanized the quote even further in 
his book Filter Bubble prefacing it with: “We are overwhelmed by a torrent of 
information” (Pariser 2012). Media scholar Robert McChesney opens the first chapter of 
Digital Disconnect with the statistic. “If one digitally recorded all extant human cultural 
artifacts and information created from the dawn of time until 2003,” he wrote, “one 
would need 5 billion gigabytes of storage space” (McChesney 2013). As recently as 2014, 
technology magazine Computerworld used the expression to describe the extent of 
government network surveillance (Storm 2014). The quote attributed to Schmidt even 
made its way into the latest edition of the Encyclopedia of Information Science and 
Technology in the entry for “Information Overload.” The list goes on – and they’re all 
wrong.  
The metaphor comes from the now-famous 2003 University of California 
Berkeley study “How much information? 2003,” which measured how much “uniquely 
created” information, was produced each year between 1999 and 2002. For three years, 
the team surveyed annual data creation and storage in four physical media: paper, film, 
optical, and magnetic, which included servers, disk drives, and camcorder tape. They 
concluded that humanity created 5 exabytes of new information in 2002. Rather than 
equating the massive information creation to the previous millennia of human speech, 
Lyman and Harian claimed in the report’s executive summary that “five exabytes of 
information is equivalent in size to the information contained in half a million new 
libraries the size of the Library of Congress print collection.” The phrase “all words ever 
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spoken by human beings” only appears once in the 113-page report, buried in a table 
showing the relative size of an exabyte. In October 2003, Science highlighted the study in 
a sidebar article titled “Data Overload,” used the Library of Congress metaphor, and also 
noted that five exabytes is equivalent to 10^18 bytes – a figure that represents the number 
of words spoken by humans since the dawn of time. Harian, who currently works as 
Google’s chief economist, confirmed via email the common usage wasn’t their intended 
meaning.  
Between 2003 and 2010, technology journalists and bloggers harkened back to the 
“How Much Information?” study. After 2010, they referenced Schmidt. The meaning 
shifted as soon as it left Berkeley, but Schmidt shifted the convenient metaphor to 
illustrate the difficulties his company faced as the Web search engine with the largest 
market share. Schmidt rebooted the trope and then it proliferated as a conflation of the 
quantity of information and the actual number of words supposedly spoken in all of 
human record. Whether the quote in its context is right or wrong is irrelevant, academia 
and the media reflected their conception of the Web in the phrase. Following sluglines 
like “Information Overload” and “Data Overload,” the metaphor conveniently illustrated 
the scale of information, contextualizing the amount of data as overwhelming. Metaphors 
are changed by and also influence the cultural context. For the people who use the 
metaphor, the accuracy isn’t important as the idea – the signification behind the signifier. 
Lyman and Harian quantified the issue while Schmidt both pointed to an issue and also 
assured the convention attendees that Google had it under control. In his remarks, he 
posed a problem and also maintained that Google was working on a solution. 
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One year after the runaway metaphor from “How Much Information? 2003,” 
global annual Internet traffic surpassed the exabyte range for the first time. In 2006, 
International Data Corporation report measured 161 exabytes of data. Cisco thinks global 
IP traffic will surpass the zettabyte barrier by the end of 2016. In just two decades, the 
Internet has evolved several lifetimes. In 2010, mobile phone traffic alone contributed 40 
exabytes to global IP traffic. By 2011, the global Internet infrastructure ran out of its 
initial 5 billion IP addresses, creating new demand for the next iteration of the Internet 
packet-switching protocol. There are many ways to measure the exponential growth of 
the Internet and also describe it in metaphor. The idea of information overload goes by 
many names: information anxiety, information pollution, information glut, and data smog. 
While the media express information overload as an issue facing the Internet-connected 
public-at-large, it’s not a new concern for corporations or the government. As early as the 
1930s, these organizations were building and using computers to analyze their operations 
and sort their data. The solution to information overload itself was originally using 
computers. Today, computers contribute to the problem of information overload. By most 
accounts, the history of computing serves as the starting point for the history of the 
Internet – both of which were initially funded and used by the military. 
The 1960s offer a reasonable first entry into the modern era of computers, but 
many world events changed the context of science and communication between the end 
of World War II and ARPA’s first experimental network in 1971. Among the most 
important events to this timeline, the government institutionalized the wartime structure 
for funding science in the United States, galvanizing the military-industrial-academic 
collaboration started with the wartime Office of Science and Research Development and 
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the Manhattan Project. The Eisenhower administration responded to the 1957 Sputnik 1 
launch by hastily funding an agency to handle military research for the Space Race. 
Kennedy launched the Moonshot, publicly charging engineers and scientists with facing 
down the Soviet Union. The Cuban Missile Crisis showed the military’s serious flaws in 
their abilities to command and control their nuclear assets. These events contributed to 
the development of the Internet with successive metaphorical uses of the American 
frontier.  
It’s important as we look at the rhetoric of science to also look at the individuals, 
where the history was lived. This thesis will toggle back and forth from examining the 
national rhetoric that contains the frontier metaphor to the history of the individuals who 
actually created the technology. For national rhetoric, I’ll use a rhetorical analysis in the 
context of the Turnerian Frontier Thesis, which serves as the basis for the foundation 
myth. Looking at the hero, narrative, and universe, it’ll be possible to examine the values 
and agenda that persuaded the policymakers and the public to support a national 
infrastructure for science funding. For the individual moments of history, I’ll use 
historical discourse analysis, interpreting the history of the Internet as a continuation of 
the successive frontiers from the discipline of Western history. As argued by Western 
historians, the metaphorical frontier has many layers – physical, ideological, political, 
rhetorical, and mythical. I’m using two different methods because I am examining the 
influence of a process on a social structure. Dissecting the foundational myth while 
focusing on a single layer provides a flat analysis without the necessary points for 
comparison.  
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In the first chapter, I’ll recount the origins of the myth of the American frontier, 
discuss the intellectual history in Western history, and establish the values associated 
with the wilderness and also frontier. In 1893, historian Frederick Jackson Turner 
presented his Frontier Thesis. The pioneers became the symbol for desirable national 
characteristics: self-reliance, rugged individualism, entrepreneurialism, and tenacity. In 
the story, they needed these traits because they lived on the edge of a savage land, 
making way for civilization.  
In the second chapter, I’ll trace how the intellectual history of Western history 
parallels and informs the usage of the metaphor that created the military-industrial 
complex. The idea of government-funded research during World War II wasn’t 
necessarily novel, but the scale certainly was. Universities melded with military and 
industry almost seamlessly during the total war. After the war, the OSDR was seen as an 
unclean thing that needed to be dismantled. As the director of the OSDR, Vannevar Bush, 
a computer scientist and first perfunctory science advisor to the president, drafted a 
document to guide the reassembling of the science community in the post-war era, it’s 
title: Science: The Endless Frontier. Bush made scientists the pioneer hero in the endless 
frontier of scientific exploration. Unfortunately, his recommendation failed as he 
envisioned, but the relationships between the military, universities, and industry persisted. 
Post-WWII policies kept the money flowing into universities through the military – 
creating the military-industrial-academic complex. 
In the third chapter, I’ll show how the pieces of Bush’s science policy that were 
enacted, created the infrastructure for the Kennedy administration’s New Frontier. 
Kennedy’s new metaphor created new heroes and instilled them with new values, 
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rerouting government grants into the new Cold War efforts, including an experimental 
network called ARPANET, which is the predecessor of the Internet. I argue our 
conceptions of the Internet is influenced by how the scientific community built and used 
it, which is significant because the distributed network, one of the democratizing features, 
was initially built for the incredibly vertical, centralized military. Early justifications for 
Internet funding included making the country’s communication infrastructure survivable 
in the event of a nuclear attack, and eventually simply a way for researchers to share 
computers more effectively. By this, I mean there were only a few computers in the 
country at the time and ARPA didn’t want to give every university their own computer, 
so it was a cost saver. The researchers who built he Internet built certain military values 
into the network – survivability, scalability, which are valuable. They also built the 
network with values that privileged sharing resources, ideas, and functionality rather than 
direct action through a vertical chain of command. The purpose of ARPANET was to 
develop a body of knowledge accessible to everyone. Though this seems obvious, I argue 
that had the Internet been created solely for corporations and government bureaucrats, it 
would have ended up as analogs to those rigid, vertical structures. 
In the fourth chapter, I’ll explain how the ARPA engineers created a new frontier 
in the Internet and continue to explain the social construction of the Internet in the 1990s. 
One of the often unspoken tenants of the frontier is that the frontier eventually becomes 
civilization. In the 1990s, John Perry Barlow built an organization to defend the Internet 
against media consolidation, overreaching government regulation, surveillance, and 
censorship. With the dotcom rush in the 1990s and the establishment of Internet 
behemoths such as AOL, Amazon, EBay, and Facebook, we see the rhetorical settlement 
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of the Internet space. In 1906, Teddy Roosevelt used the frontier to defend 8 million 
acres of Western land against industrial development. With the seemingly unlimited 
space of the Western states, politicians could call for expansion. Once the frontier closed, 
however, calls for expansion turned into pleas for defense of a finite, cherished land. We 
see the same pivot in 1990s with organizations like the EFF turning their legal resources 
toward the government and industry. Ultimately, I argue they defend the values initially 
instilled into the network by ARPA researchers.  
The nature of the Internet derives from the values and cultural meanings instilled 
by collaborative engineers and scientists to solve a geographic problem with a technical 
solution. With the popularization of the Internet, engineers dematerialize the technology 
into metaphor so that first-time users might understand their inventions and innovations 
immediately. Computers themselves are metaphors and representations for the way the 
scientific community conceives the human brain and memory. Within the conception of 
the Internet, policymakers and scientists fold metaphor into rhetoric to instill new values 
and uses in the network. As we study the Internet, scholars, technology gurus, and the 
collective “Internet” create new tropes to illustrate and reinforce the nature of the 
network – a network the scientific community created in its collaborative likeness. By 
tracing the rhetorical history of the Internet, it’s possible to recount the agendas, 
resources, and visions of the people who conceived the global network of networks.   
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CHAPTER II 
THE FRONTIER THESIS 
In 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner presented his essay “The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History,” colloquially known as the Frontier Thesis, to the meeting 
of the American Historical Association in Chicago. Turner argued that distinctly 
American values existed as a result of the nation’s westward expansion and contact with 
a wild terrain. As the United States attempted to define its national identity in the 
nineteenth century, ideas coalesced around the frontier as “something uniquely 
American” (R. Nash 2001, 35). The Old World might have had centuries of civilization, 
but the New World had massive tracts of land unmatched in Europe. However, having 
lots of land was not a unique quality. Europe had land, too. To be uniquely American, the 
land needed to exemplify a purely American element – it’s wildness (R. Nash 2001). The 
scale of wilderness present in the New World, and the people who conquered it had no 
Old World counterpart, thus the beginnings of the national identity. For 250 years, a 
physical boundary delineated the artificial bubble of civilization and the American 
wilderness on the Western edge of the United States. Key to this definition is the premise 
that America’s wilderness physically moved and culturally changed in those centuries, 
impacting definitions for both civilization and wilderness.  
The Internet, science, and the Frontier Thesis are inexorably linked. The broad 
stroke of the Frontier Thesis was the embryo of an academic discipline, just as the broad 
stroke of Bush’s Science: The Endless Frontier, and Kennedy’s New Frontier created and 
implemented the contemporary framework for publicly funded science. By the 1990s, the 
frontier served as a suitable metaphor for the geographic expansiveness of the Internet 
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and its value as an economic and social platform. Given the powerful response to the 
Frontier Thesis in contemporary political rhetorical supporting science and widely 
accepted parallels between the Internet and the 19th century frontier condition, it’s useful 
to examine the origins of the myth of the American frontier, discuss the intellectual 
history in Western history, and establish the values associated with the wilderness and 
also the frontier.  
Since the frontier metaphor often accompanies the conquest and creation of new 
spaces, then it’s necessary first to start, like Turner, from the year the frontier closed in 
1890. The 1890 Census is important to modern statecraft, computing, and the myth of the 
American frontier in a few ways. First, the census was the most radical data collection 
effort by the U.S. government about its citizens in its history until that point. Its success 
was only made possibly by a computing machine. Second, the mechanical enumeration 
was the culmination of a long history of increasingly improved government technics for 
measuring the U.S. population and its holdings. Finally, the 1890 census was the first 
time the U.S. government successfully enumerated the Native American population, 
measured the nation’s industrial prowess, and collected data about its national resources, 
marking the victory of a two-century war with nature and the indigenous people.  
In 1890, the U.S. Census Bureau for the first time enumerated the country’s 
population with a machine. Designed by former census employee and founder of the 
Tabulating Machine Company, Herman Hollerith, the Electronic Tabulation System 
employed a punch-card technology that could process 0.53 cards per second. Though the 
Tabulator machine couldn’t add, subtract, divide, or multiply, it could count. As census 
marshals returned their census sheets, clerks used red ink to add alphabetical or numerical 
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codes in certain schedule columns for technical operators to punch into cards. Tabulator 
operators then fed the punch cards into the machines for tabulation. The 1880 census took 
seven years to enumerate 50,189,209 people and compile industrial and economic 
statistics. The 1890 census took only two and a half years. The Census Office announced 
a “rough count” of the population after only six weeks of processing and then released 
the official numbers after the tabulation office in Washington, D.C., received the last 
returns, which were “delayed in the mail by being improperly addressed” (Wright and 
Hunt 1900). Hollerith’s tabulation machine significantly improved census processes, 
allowing policymakers to collect and compile increasingly granular data about the 
population and economy. U.S. Census Bureau Superintendent Robert P. Porter writes 
proudly in the 1896 population report abstract, “Statistics regarding the conjugal 
condition of the people of the United States are presented for the first time as a part of the 
United States census” (7). He notes that previous censuses, namely in 1870 and 1880, 
collected the data, but “means were not at hand for its compilation” (7). Though a 
required function of the U.S. Constitution to establish districts for the members of the 
House of Representatives and distribute electoral votes, the decennial census only started 
in the late nineteenth century, providing the opportunity for the Secretary of State to 
investigate social issues and economic trends.  
If the history of the Internet parallels the history of the computing, then there are 
two important two side notes about Hollerith and his Tabulator. First, Hollerith founded 
the Tabulating Machine Company in 1896, and then merged with International Time 
Recording Company, Bundy Manufacturing Company, and the Computing Scale 
Company in 1901 to form a new corporation called the Computing-Tabulating-Recording 
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(CTR) Company (The New York Times 1911). In 1924, the CTR board of directors 
changed the company name to International Business Machines, or IBM. Second, I 
mentioned in chapter one that early as the 1930s, government organizations were 
building and using computers to analyze their operations and sort their data. The punch 
card-operated Tabulator marks an early manifestation of Habermas’ “instrumental 
rationality.” Hollerith’s punch card design dominated computer design for nearly a 
century. Thomas Streeter points out in The Net Effect that the large machines “predictably 
carried out routine tasks that were tightly specified beforehand from on high; this fit the 
corporate model to a T” (Streeter 2011, 28). In the 1960s business computing was the 
fastest areas of growth with IBM the leading vendor industry (Streeter 2011, 28). IBM 
will show up again in the second and third chapters as a major government contractor for 
computing machines. I argue that had the Internet been created solely for corporations 
and government bureaucrats, it would have ended up as an analog to those rigid, vertical 
structures, similar to the Hollerith machine and its successors. 
Hollerith’s counting machine provided the means for the first detailed map of the 
U.S. population and its holdings, marking a major milestone for the U.S. government’s 
ability to collect information about its citizens. The first census in 1790 collected the 
name of the head of the family, and the number of people in the family described as: 
“free white males of 16 and upward; free white males under 16 years; free white females; 
all other free person; slaves” (Gauthier 2002). Marshals set out on the first Monday of 
August 1790 under order of Congress to enumerate the population, using as many 
assistants as they deemed necessary to complete the count in nine calendar months. Each 
marshal had another three months to count their results and transmit them directly to the 
	  
	  
 15 
President. Severe financial penalties awaited any marshal or assistant who falsified 
records or failed to file their returns. The first enumeration was printed in a small octavo 
pamphlet of 56 pages, stating the colonial population of the United States as 3,929,214 
people – dispelling the exaggerated colloquial estimates preceding the first systematic 
enumeration (Wright and Hunt 1900).  
As the U.S. population grew, the enumeration became more complicated, 
requiring the Census Bureau to improve technics. Until 1830, state census offices and 
individual enumerators supplied their own schedules for the U.S. Census; using whatever 
paper they had available. Without uniform schedules, U.S. Census superintendents relied 
on scattered, incomplete data to compile statistics about population, and left them unable 
to track social and economic trends. For the 1830 census, the U.S. government printed 
uniform schedules with detailed instructions for enumerators, significantly improving 
their ability to collect accurate, standardized data. Centralized control over the collection 
of standardized data allowed superintendents to direct research beyond basic population 
statistics toward issues deemed nationally important by the Secretary of State. The 1840 
Census Act authorized the collection of statistics pertaining to “the pursuits, industry, 
education, and resources of the country” (Gauthier 2002, 125). Beginning in 1850, census 
marshals started collecting social statistics such as taxes, schools, crime, mortgages, 
mortality, and mental illness. As manufacturing centers grew in the United States, the 
Bureau attempted to collect data about economic output in the 1860 and 1870 censuses. 
But these attempts failed, so the 1880 Census Act replaced marshals with specially 
appointed agents to collect technical data on manufacturing processes. The 1880 Census 
report featured 19 additional special volumes for industrial statistics, including 
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agriculture, mining, transportation, telecommunications, petroleum production, and water 
power. U.S. Census Bureau data collection, classifications, and special reporting are 
particularly telling about a decade’s social, economic, and political issue foci, so it’s 
interesting when the same census report that “officially” closes the American frontier also 
issues a special report enumerating Native Americans. After a failed attempt to count the 
extant Native population in 1880, the U.S. Census Bureau issued the first complete 
special report in 1890. 
Superintendent Porter opened the first volume of the 1890 census results with a 
paragraph of significance for the history of the frontier and the United States: 
 
Up to and including 1880, the country had a frontier of settlement, but at present 
the unsettled area has been so broken into by isolated bodies of settlement that 
there can hardly be said to be a frontier line. In the discussion of this extent, its 
westward movement, etc., it can not, therefore, any longer have a place in the 
census reports (35). 
 
With closing of the American Frontier, Porter concluded that the census would no 
longer collect data about Westward expansion. The 1890 census signaled that the war 
against the Western lands and the indigenous people who inhabited them had come to an 
end. It was time for America to fully evaluate its spoils. The 1890 census was the first 
enumeration of Native Americans living within the jurisdiction of the United States, 
including the reservations. Each schedule from 1830 to 1860 was designed to enumerate 
all free people “except Indians not taxed,” meaning Native Americans living on the 
reservations or subsistence living (Gauthier 2002). Instructions for the 1870 and 1880 
census asked the marshals to enumerate the Native population in their territories for a 
special report to the census office because it was “highly desirable, for statistical purpose, 
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that the number of persons not living on reservations be known.” (Gauthier 2002) Though 
ordered to seek out Native people, enumerators for the 1870 and 1880 censuses failed to 
comprehensively document the population. The closing of the frontier gave the 
government impetus to tally the extant Native populations living both on and off 
reservations. The Hollerith’s Tabulator provided the necessary technology to count the 
country’s population faster and more accurately than ever before.  
The 1890 census also inspired a young historian to write an essay that established 
America’s national identity and a new Western history. Turner’s Frontier Thesis refers to 
the aforementioned quote by Superintendent Porter in its first line and then develops his 
argument for American exceptionalism, frontier values, based on the nation’s relationship 
to wilderness.  
“This brief official statement marks the closing of a great historic movement. Up 
to our own day American history has been in a large degree the history of the 
colonization of the Great West. The existence of free land, its continuous 
recession, and the advance of American Settlement westward, explain American 
development” (Turner 1). 
 
In this opening statement, Turner sets up an argument sets up an argument that’s been 
debated by historians, used by politicians in rhetoric, and reconstructed in film and media. 
His argument was that distinctly American values existed as a result of the nation’s 
westward expansion and contact with a wild terrain. Turner defines the frontier as “the 
outer edge of a wave – the meeting point between savagery and civilization” (Turner 
2013). His remarks about the “savagery” of wilderness require deconstruction because 
remnants of the values that Turner associates with the untamed Western states carry over 
into the contemporary metaphorical wildernesses (and frontiers) of science and the 
Internet. To understand the frontier as a symbol, it’s equally important to understand the 
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definition of wilderness, the changing historical perspectives of the frontier, and their 
limitations.  
In the seminal environmental history Wilderness and the American Mind, Nash 
traces cultural constructions of the wilderness from ancient to contemporary times. In 
Nash’s pre-Romantic conceptions of the wilderness, he pulled apart the Bible and 
medieval texts. In classical mythology, he found demons, wild beasts, and semi-human 
men inhabiting wild places. In the Bible, he recognized the wilderness as the antipode to 
paradise when Adam and Eve were cast into the wilderness, but also as a place of 
religious purification as Christ was tempted in the wilderness. In the Middle Ages, he 
points to religious groups entering the wilderness as a place of refuge, but on the whole, 
he concluded, “Western thought generated a powerful bias against wilderness and the 
settlement of the New World offered abundant opportunity for the expression of this 
sentiment” (R. Nash 2001, 22).  
As late as the eighteenth century, American usage of the word “wilderness” 
connoted a useless, dangerous, unorganized area. “In it’s raw state, it had little to offer 
civilized men and women” (Cronon 1995, 71). In the frontier myth, pioneers developed 
the land, overcoming nature and the indigenous people with technology and making the 
land useful, but they still sat at the edge of fearsome nature (R. Nash 2001). The 
wilderness was still an enemy that had to be conquered, vanquished, and subdued. The 
pioneer mission was to bring civilization to the wilderness, but first the pioneer needed to 
break the wilderness to make it useful. Only once they built their homesteads and farms 
was nature useful, beautiful, and friendly, as suggested by the Jeffersonian notion of the 
pastoral ideal. The distance from civilization and wilderness are important in the frontier 
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thesis. Too much “savage wilderness” and a “man may become savage” (R. Nash 2001, 
45). Following this idea, Cronon points to two naturalists who stepped over the line.  
Early Romantic poet William Wordsworth favored an awe-filled bewilderment 
when interacting with the wilderness as when he wrote about climbing the Alps in the 
poem The Prelude. “The symbols he detected in this wilderness landscape were more 
supernatural than natural, and they inspired him more awe and dismay than joy or 
pleasure” (Cronon 1995, 74). When transcendentalist author Henry David Thoreau 
climbed Maine’s famed Mount Katahdin in 1846, he felt “a stern loneliness,” even 
despite the fact that he made trip while sojourning on the shores of Walden Pond. In his 
book The Maine Woods recording his trip, Thoreau recounted a fearsome experience 
summiting Katahdin during a storm. He described the mountain as “vast, Titanic, and 
such as man never inhabits.” As he fights for purchase on the summit, he 
anthropomorphizes Nature: “She seems to say sternly, why came ye here before your 
time? … I cannot pity nor fondle thee here, but forever relentlessly drive thee hence to 
[the valleys] where I am kind. Why seek me where I have not called thee, and then 
complain because you find but a stepmother” (Thoreau 1988, 34). Wild country might 
have offered Thoreau necessary freedom and solitude, but he got too close. Ultimately, 
however, Nash points out that Thoreau’s writing was only ever superficially about the 
natural world. “Following Emerson’s dictum ‘the whole of nature is a metaphor of the 
human mind,’ he turned to it repeatedly as a figurative tool” (R. Nash 2001, 89). In the 
nineteenth century, Romanticism recast the wilderness as something sublime, rather than 
fearsome. Nash asserts that appreciation for wilderness started in the city, in the parlor, in 
literature among the affluent and elite. If nineteenth century Americans built a 
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civilization from the raw materials of a physical wilderness, then they equally built 
wilderness from the cultural materials of civilization. Romantic writers concluded it was 
best for a person to live with a foot in the civilized, and also in the wild, idealizing a 
middle space (R. Nash 2001). While wilderness was fearsome, too much civilization, and 
he will be come anxious and dull.  
Urban populations exploded in the late nineteenth century. “In 1880 there was but 
one city, New York … In 1890 there are three, New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia,” 
wrote Superintendent Porter writes in the 1890 census report (1896). As early as the 
1830s, rapid urbanization prompted a political doctrine that wielded free land as a 
weapon against the industrialization of society – the safety value. The doctrine 
maintained that as long as there was free land on the frontier, then the people filling the 
cities always had a place to turn for relief from unemployment and poverty. As Horace 
Greeley said in 1837 while encouraging emigrants to leave the cities after the Panic of 
1837: “Go West, young man, go forth into the country.” Ultimately, the West would 
serve to keep down social conflict in the East. In Europe, “the poverty of urban laborers 
had begotten a depravity, a dependence and corruption which would make them 
undesirable citizens in a republic” (Smith 1971, 203). Thomas Jefferson thought back to 
the conditions in Europe when he wrote free land would encourage industrial workers to 
“quit their trades and go to laboring the earth” if industrialists attempted “to reduce them 
to the minimum of subsistence” (Smith 1971, 203). Historians and social scholars debate 
whether the Homestead Act either helped Western farmer or Eastern laborers, but it’s 
certain that Turner was particularly concerned that with the frontier closed, the “safety 
valve” also closed.  
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The wilderness-civilization dichotomy serves as a necessary backdrop for a 
discussion about the Frontier Myth, and its dialectics between Westward expansion and 
nationalism, technology and nature, and rugged individualism and community. While 
Nash (2001) later defined the frontier merely as the boundary between civilization and 
the wilderness solely on location, Turner’s thesis is important because it emphasized the 
values frontier inhabitants adopt because of their location. Pioneers are masters of 
material things, restless, independent, collaborative within their communities, direct in 
action, curious, entrepreneurial, and ruggedly determined (Turner 2013). Most 
importantly, they acquired those traits as a result of their interaction with wilderness. 
These values are easily traced forward into political speeches by Teddy Roosevelt in 
defense of national public lands, Vannevar Bush’s Endless Frontier for publicly funded 
science, and John F. Kennedy’s New Frontier.  
Turner found such momentum for this idea because it veered sharply from the 
dominant historical perspective at the time, which claimed American national identity 
was still attached to the Old World. The East coast of the United States was settled as the 
frontier for Europe. While Turner’s Frontier Thesis is considered the genesis of Western 
history, historians disagree where the West begins. The boundary lines and values of the 
West are major issue in one of the largest paradigm shift in Western history – the shift 
from viewing “frontier as a process” to “frontier as a place.“  
The contemporary fields of Western and frontier history are separated into several 
groups: Turnerians, regionalists, and most recently “so-called” New Western Historians. 
As paradigmatic boundaries shift, the names change to distinguish the new borders. 
Historians who subscribe to the Turnerian perspective generally view the frontier process 
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as initiated when Quaker settlers landed on the eastern coast of the United States. 
Ostensibly, the settlers landed in England’s transatlantic frontier. When Western history 
developed into a separate field of study under the tutelage of Turner, it involved isolating 
not only a portion of America from the rest, but also all of America from Europe. New 
western history takes as its starting point the idea that the West is a specific, identifiable 
place. While process scholars attempt to pinpoint the event or time period when the 
Frontier ceases to be the frontier, the regionalists tell the story of how each individual 
region was formed and reproduced through diverse cultures interacting with each other 
and nature. They also believe the frontier process perspective homogenizes individual 
experiences. In the following chapters about the development of the Internet, I’ve adapted 
this concept from Western history to Internet history. Rhetoric at the high, political level 
conforms to the process orientation. Individual, lived history closely resembles the 
regional orientation. In the next chapter, I’ll provide my conditions for analyzing Internet 
history as presence of metaphor, idealized values, location of the rhetoric in relation to 
the history, and the importance of geography.  
This analysis primarily draws from this rich body of historiographical articles in 
Western Historical Quarterly to define the parameters of the ideological sects of Western 
historians. From the 1960s until the 1990s, Turnerians and regionalists debated about the 
causes of the frontier state, the location of the West, the successiveness of the frontier, 
and the origin of American values.  
In the 1960s, successive rounds of criticism left Western history without a center. 
Turnerians defended their paradigm against regionalists who saw the Thesis as 
“nationalistic, simplistic, and hopelessly mired in metaphors of racial and sexual 
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domination” (Neel 1994, 492). Where Turner was absent, second-generation Turnerians, 
such as Walter Prescott Webb, author of the classic 1931 study The Great Plains, often 
stood as surrogate whipping boys in the debate. The selected articles from the early 1970s 
represent Turnerian authors’ defenses of their paradigm. Overall, the authors defended 
Turner’s philosophy as imperfect, but seminal. These authors encouraged their peers to 
ignore the orthodox limitations of the Frontier Thesis and understand Turner in the 
context of his time and task. In recognizing the limitations of the Frontier Thesis, many 
Turnerian authors in this era generally did not attack regionalism, rather they called for a 
centrist approach that used place-orientation as evidence for Turner’s “procession of 
civilization.”  
Turner biographer Ray Billington was the era’s biggest proponent for process-
orientation, publishing three articles defending Turner in the early 1970s alone. Malone 
(1989) asserts that Billington “deserves much of the credit for the endurance of Turner’s 
work” (411). In Billington’s 1970 article “The Frontier and I,” he recalls the anti-
Turnerian sentiment of the late 1930s and 1940s as spurred by the “over-enthusiasm” of 
Turner’s “many disciples” (Billington 1970, 12). The historical profession’s negative 
reaction primarily stemmed from early exaggeration of the frontier’s importance to 
political thought and national identity. The first Turnerians went “far beyond their master 
in asserting that the frontier was the sole force molding the nation’s institutions, not 
simply one of many” (Billington 1970, 12). Jacobs makes a similar defense from 
studying Turner’s educational and academic background. Engaging the regionalist 
argument that Turner cites only the frontier as the cause for the nation’s identity – the 
frontier, Jacobs (1970) concludes that Turner conceptualized history as “dynamic and 
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alive” (369) with multiple causes affecting historical events. In defense of Turner, Young 
points to a number of locations in the Frontier Thesis that suggest multi-causality 
including the its mention of abundance of resources, public policy, and Jeffersonian 
ideals (1970, 150). 
Billington engaged regionalists again about whether Turner proliferated the 
unscientific idea that acquired traits could somehow be inherited. In 1960, Henry E. 
Huntington Library opened Turner’s unpublished correspondence to scholars. Within 
these documents, Billington found evidence that “the best scientific authority of the day 
would agree with him that the frontier environment would alter the character of the 
pioneers” (1970, 14). In this way, Billington pleaded with his peers to understand 
Turner’s work in the context of his scientific environment.  
Edgar Pomeroy also encouraged his peers to remove their conceptual straight 
jackets. “They have run an irregular boundary line about the historical West that 
sometimes has to pass down the middle of the city streets to avoid the man who does not 
fit into the formula” (Pomeroy 1955, 579). While this analysis primarily focuses on the 
far ends of the debate, many historians folded Turnerian concepts into a regionalist 
format. Occasionally, an author will engage in a regional essay that’s positioned around a 
blind spot of the Frontier Thesis, like when John D.W. Guice writes, “few of Webb’s 
admirers are more devoted than the author … Nevertheless, Webb appeared blind to the 
antecedents of the cattle kingdom as an industry” (1977, 167). Still, many reputations 
were made attacking or defending his work and his methodologies, particularly in book 
reviews, which at a cursory count happened consistently across the eras. Reviewers 
appear to always make note of the author’s position on the political continuum of the 
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Western history. Occasionally, the reviewer centralizes the entire review as to whether 
the author takes a Turnerian or regionalist point of view. In the first sentence of an entire 
review aligning William H. McNeill’s The Great Frontier within the political continuum 
of Western history, the reviewer writes: “Between Frederick Jackson Turner and Walter 
Prescott Webb, William H. McNeill prefers Webb.” Engaging the regionalists on the 
usual battlegrounds, these authors attempted to persuade their peers to ignore the 
orthodox limitations of the Frontier Thesis and understand Turner’s work in context.  
The discussions within the frontier and Western historian community in this era 
took a nearly religious tone. In the 1980s, Martin Ridge claims that most regionalists miss 
the point. “Most of Turner’s critics either challenged specific facts or accused him of the 
sins of inconsistency, overemphasis, omission, and rhetorical vagueness” (Ridge 1988, 7). 
The broad stroke of the Frontier Thesis was the embryo of an academic discipline. As 
Ridge points out, there was no Western history before Turner (1988).  
In sum, historians were increasingly hostile toward orthodox Turnerians in the 
1930s and 1940s. In the 1960s, successive battles drove the Turnerians and regionalists 
further away from the centrist view. In the 1970s and early 1980s, neo-Turnerians, chief 
among them Ray Billington, attempted to contextualize Turner within the milieu of the 
late 19th century. Facilitated by journals like The Western Historical Quarterly, debates 
like these in the 1960s and 1970s gave the field of Western history vitality. By the late 
1980s, The Western Historical Quarterly drastically turned down the volume of their 
navel-gazing. Turner’s name disappeared from titles, but consistently remained in 
footnotes, and then in the 1990s, Turner made a comeback. The journal’s winter edition 
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in 1994 signified a shift toward the “so-called new western historians” – as the articles’ 
authors repeatedly referred to the trend. 
In 1994, editors of The Western Historical Quarterly invited six historians to 
respond to David Emmon’s “Constructed Province” (1994a) – a treatise that claims the 
paradoxes of old western history can be “swept away only if we agree to embrace a fixed, 
uncontested definition of what we mean by ‘the West’” (Cronon 1994, 477). Five authors 
responded to Emmons and then he responded to them all in “In Defense of Subregions 
and the Imposed Myth” (1994b). In this collection of articles, the authors neither 
banished nor renewed the Frontier Thesis so much as dissected, qualified, and folded 
pieces of it into regionalism. Emmons and the responding authors attempted to once 
again define the boundaries of the West, contextualize the West within larger national 
and world events, and construct a framework open enough to include minority groups 
often invisible in western history. In this published debate, these historians solidify the 
goals of the new paradigm and position the paradigm counter to the Frontier Thesis.  
In “Constructed Province,” Emmons attempts to divide the American West into 
analytically stable regions, identify economic and cultural identities for these subregions, 
and defect from mythology about the source of subregional identity. He asserts that 
unique economic, geographic, and social forces delineate eight Western subregions: 
cornbelt West, wheatbelt West, hydraulic West, cattle and sheep West, urban West, 
corporate/resource extraction West, wageworkers’ West, and the Native Americans. In 
his constructed West, Emmons suggests that geographic determinism is unavoidable in 
New Western History if it means to distinguish the West and its people (437). Though 
this closely follows Turner assertion American history was distinct from Europe, 
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Emmons stops short from the notion that the West ceased being western at the close of 
the frontier. Emmons’ West exists as the result of a complex dialogue with the rest of the 
nation rather than merely frontier interactions – a key point in his essay. 
In “A Place of Extremes: Nature, History, and the American West,” Susan 
Rhoades Neel (1994) less responded to Emmons’ article so much as suggested a place for 
nature and the environment in the new framework: “New western history takes as its 
starting point the idea that the West is a specific, identifiable place and that western 
history is properly the story of how that region was formed and reproduced over time 
through the interaction of diverse cultures with each other and nature” (490). New 
western history is seen as a counter paradigm to the Frontier Thesis, but Neel also 
conceded nuanced similarities between Turner’s frontier and new western history. Chief 
among these similarities, Neel emphasized nature as a leading force of change rather than 
Western’s own force upon nature instilling them with certain identities and values. “Who 
we are, as individuals and as a society, derives from the ways in which we have drawn 
our physical and spiritual sustenance from the physical world in which we live” (505).  
In “The West: A Moving Target,” William Cronon (1994) took aim at Emmons 
most directly. Cronon states that Emmons simply recreated the old issues of successive 
frontiers typical of Ray Billington, monolithic identities of Turner, and the continuation 
of the old identity in contemporary times. Though he conceded that Emmons’ actors are 
more diverse than Turner’s, “they seem just as white, just as Euroamerican, just as male” 
(1994, 480). On this point, Yvette Huginnie agreed in “Historical Construction, Multiple 
Casualties, and the American West.” Huginnie called for the pasts of women, Hispanics, 
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blacks, European immigrants, and Native Americans to play a larger role in the new 
western paradigm.  
Though the responses are critical, they are productive. Turnerians and the new 
western historians agree on several points: that the West has an eastern edge, the 
environment affects change on the people and their identity, and the West was 
constructed as a result of large national and world conditions. Given the perennial usage 
of the frontier as a metaphor for science and the Internet, I’ll use these responses as a 
framework for the nature of the Internet in the next three chapters. First, I’ll maintain that 
though the Internet might not appear to have physical boundaries, it has contentious 
spaces. The Internet has both an eastern and western edge in terms of governance, the 
east and west coasts of the United States. While the environment likely does affect people 
and their identities as suggested by Cronon, I assert that geography plays a larger role in 
the origin of the Internet. Finally, just as the West was constructed as a result of large 
national and world conditions, so was the Internet.  
Discussion among Western historians about the Frontier Thesis goes back to 1893 
– and the battle spills into many other disciplines as well. American Studies scholar 
Richard Slotkin traces the full development of the myth of the American frontier in a 
trilogy, concluding the Frontier is a violent cultural device. Political scientists and 
historians alike lament that Turner’s philosophy has been seized upon to exercise 
totalitarian government planning (Rundbell 1959). Scholars of rhetoric consider the 
Turnerian frontier as a problematic metaphor (Ceccarelli 2013). Politicians wield the 
Thesis as a rhetorical device with varying levels of success (Dorsey 1995; Jordan 2003; 
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Bush 1945; Opt 1996). Indeed, the frontier is a problematic symbol, yet remarkably 
resilient in the face of criticism. 
The broad stroke of the Frontier Thesis was the embryo of an academic discipline, 
just as the broad stroke of Bush’s Science: The Endless Frontier, and Kennedy’s New 
Frontier created and implemented the contemporary framework for publicly funded 
science. Similarly, government agencies like ARPA that funded high-risk, high-reward 
research grew out of the rhetoric of the frontier as applied to science. The Turner debate 
shows that myth can become history and history can become myth. The mythic history, 
or the Turnerian point of view, distills the national identity into a value-laden archetype 
and explains the existence of those values based on environmental factors. As early as the 
1950s historians like Pomeroy (1955) asserted that his peers should take Turner in 
context, making the point that Turner was as a good a salesman as a historian. Pomeroy 
maintains that, yes, Turner’s writing was soaring in concept and rhetoric, but also 
reminds that “the prophet was less orthodox than the priesthood” (599). The same could 
be true about Bush, Licklider, or Kennedy and their future disciples. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ENDLESS FRONTIER OF SCIENCE 
Though the men and women who created the Internet worked in a system created 
by rhetoric replete with frontier heroes, conquistadors, and villains, they themselves 
didn’t necessary live to the values and character created by the persistent mythology. 
According to dominant frontier rhetoric, to be a good frontiersman, then it’s necessary to 
explore the unknown with the courage of an explorer, breaking trails to reap the rewards 
of new opportunities. Interaction with wild, unknown spaces developed character of the 
pioneer, instilling the pioneer with values that informed their cultural identity. This, of 
course, is a useful myth.  
Rather than pioneers driven by romantic, expansionist goals, the people who 
worked at these places of Internet history simply applied their technical skills and 
knowledge toward a technological goal. In the case of Vint Cerf and Bob Kahn, it meant 
attempting to find an efficient packet switching solution that would allow computers to 
talk with one another in a network. For Joe Postel, the silent hero among the pioneers of 
Internet history, it meant maintaining a collaborative environment among science 
stakeholders with the CFPs. Within the rhetoric of science, they are the heroes who “have 
the rare capacity to hear the one everlasting whisper” and trudge singularly into the 
wilderness. In actuality these individuals were agents of technological innovation they 
could only maintain in collaborative environments that privileged intellectual freedom 
and open discourse. They improved upon technology to which thousands of other 
scientists already contributed in similar environments across the country – and the world. 
The disparity between hero scientists and the collaborative scientific community is 
	  
	  
 31 
among the primary differences between the frontier of science mythology and the reality 
of the historic moments.  
There are key differences between the histories created by Internet regionalists 
and Turnerians. Both sides, however, contextualize historical events. The regionalists 
look at how the story of the Internet was formed and reproduced through government-
private corporations interacting with each other. The Internet Turnerians might 
understand the Internet as a regional landscape, but its creation epitomizes a single 
moment of conception in rhetoric and then reproduced the values portrayed by heroes in 
successive waves of innovation. Harkening back to the intellectual development of 
Western history, these differences can be expressed in the presence of metaphor, values 
associated with their idealized pasts and futures, location of the rhetoric in relation to the 
history, and the importance of geography. 
First, the presence of the frontier metaphor or its subordinate metaphors is 
particularly telling in the orientation of a story. Internet regionalists typically avoid the 
use of metaphors, neutralize the Frontier Thesis metaphor, or position themselves against 
process orientation. The metaphor is problematic in its determinism and emphasis on 
individual contributions rather than an effort of a group in technological succession. 
Internet historians largely embody a regionalist perspective. Internet Turnerians, however, 
employ the metaphor of the Frontier in process-oriented rhetoric for a public audience. In 
sum, the Frontier Thesis is most effective for public rhetoric and discourse, and largely 
absent in historical accounts and communication intended for consumption by internal, 
expert stakeholders. 
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Second, place-orientation traditionally arises after process-orientation. “Each age 
writes the history of the past anew with reference to the conditions uppermost in its own 
time,” said Frederick Jackson Turner (Williams 1955). Process-oriented rhetoric 
persuades public stakeholders to support scientific activity. Place-oriented accounts 
follow knowledge creation and innovation within the context of collaboration. Just as the 
technologies in question did not spring into the world fully formed, neither did the heroes 
of the Frontier Thesis or the frontier of science. Process heroes are the key figures for 
these origin myths because they exemplify desirable traits and values associated with the 
rhetor’s ideology. Place historians promote groups of individuals as they interact within a 
human or natural ecosystem, taking into account their relationships to ancestral 
technological epochs and sociotechnical systems. In sum, place-oriented history takes 
into account multiple causes for an event or series of events, and process-oriented 
rhetoric tends to single out a particular cause for an event in order to persuade. 
Third, despite their differences both place-oriented history and process rhetoric 
are deterministic. The premise of regionalism is that a place’s geography makes it 
specific. Within the various agencies, subcultures positioned their identity against the 
monolithic corporations and governments. To say that government officials allowed the 
small groups of researchers to create their culture with the machinations of big 
government is deterministic, but it’s determinisitic in a different way than the mythopoeic 
heroes of process-oriented rhetoric. Process myths articulate the future according to the 
values established by its narrative as exemplified by the hero. These myths create their 
own mythopoeic universe to serve a larger purpose. Place histories reinforce the role of a 
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collaborative scientific community, drawing attention away from the individuals lofted to 
pedestals in rhetoric and contextualizing their roles in the community of scientists.   
Finally, Geography very much plays a role in the history of the Internet. First, 
geography and communication always coexist. Technological epochs are defined by the 
speed at which information travels. With the telegraph, information could for the first 
time travel faster than the fastest transportation of the time. Second, the Internet was born 
in the West, which became the place of scientific research in the 1940s. Old frontier 
states became the ground zero for a technological explosion during the Atomic Age. In 
sum, geography matters. 
The history of the Internet starts at the intersection of the Atomic Age and 
computing. In November 1942, J. Robert Oppenheimer visited the Los Alamos Boys’ 
School with Manhattan Project director General Leslie Groves to determine whether the 
small school complex near Otowi, New Mexico, could serve as the secret laboratory 
where his team would build an atomic bomb. Despite disagreeing quite regularly about 
manpower requirements, resources, and personnel structure, the men agreed both on the 
location of the site and the need for the secret work to be centralized. In the early months 
of 1943, Leo Szilard, Richard Feynman, Neils Bohr, Edward Teller, Oppenheimer and 
other physicists moved with their families into the militarized facility to continue work 
on the bomb. 
Historian Mark Fiege characterizes Groves as a staunch utilitarian with a rigid, 
disciplined lifestyle and a reputation for getting things done. Before becoming director of 
the Manhattan Project, he worked as the manager for the construction of the Pentagon 
and other massive Army Corps of Engineer projects both stateside and abroad. His new 
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mission was significantly bigger even than building the largest office building in the 
world. Ninety percent of the Manhattan Project costs came from constructing bomb-
making facilities in three states, including the first industrial grade plutonium plant in 
Hanford, Washington, and employing 125,000 men. Logistically, he was well fit to win 
the war of the atom, but among his greatest challenges was managing the scientists at the 
small complex in Los Alamos. 
Rigid military structure and science didn’t initially mix at Los Alamos. 
Oppenheimer’s scientists required free inquiry, open communication, and debate. They 
encouraged intellectual openness and actively resisted the military demands for efficiency 
and command hierarchy. Groves often treated the scientists like his junior officers, 
initially even wanting to commission the scientists as Army Corps Engineer officers, but 
the researchers declined. The scientists remained civilian employees, but also underwent 
constant surveillance and censorship in their town on the mesa. “Ultimately, Los Alamos 
became a site of collaboration and compromise between the atomic scientists and the 
Army Corps of Engineers” (Fiege 2012, 296). In Groves’ estimation, these engineers 
could build the bomb, win the war, “which to him continued America’s conquest of the 
frontier” (Fiege 2012, 293). In this way, Groves’ conception of the frontier merged with 
Oppenheimer’s who followed Bush’s notion that the next frontier was knowledge. So, in 
the end, the scientists and military co-existed, allowing the scientists an open, informal 
space for scientific process and intellectual freedom within the machinations of the 
military. The military funded science without interfering with the process of science, 
even though militarizing scientific knowledge itself was antithetical to the values of the 
largely humanitarian scientists. The scientists, however, feared the Germans might 
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develop the bomb first. They joined the strict life within their compound to collaborate 
and expand the knowledge of their field with nearly unlimited resources from the federal 
government. Nobel Laureate Niels Bohr, though initially ambivalent about the project, 
eventually embraced the work: 
“Not only would the bomb establish peace, Bohr believed, but controlling it 
would require the nations of the Earth to create an ‘open world’ in which they 
must share scientific knowledge for the betterment of all. The only question was 
whether the bomb had enough sheer might to produce this outcome” (in Fiege 
2012, 299). 
 
On July 16, 1945, Bohr and the other scientists first experienced the “sheer 
might” of the first atomic explosion. Behind a blast wall, ten miles from Ground Zero, 
Vannevar Bush, Groves, Oppenheimer and his team, listened to physicist Samuel Allison 
count down to zero over a loudspeaker. They nervously joked in the bunker, considering 
the possibility that a miscalculation might send a ball of hyper-heated air into their safe 
viewing area, or potentially igniting the Earth’s atmosphere. At zero, a burst of filled the 
sky. A fireball mushroomed 41,000 feet into the sub-stratosphere. Shock and sound 
waves shot away from the blast. They calculated correctly. Safe from the immediate blast, 
they brought into existence a technology that changed the world. Though the project 
might encourage nations to share scientific knowledge, it became clear that controlling 
the bomb for peace meant something different for Americans than the rest of the world. 
“Intelligence on the American bomb hurtled Soviet and American leaders toward postwar 
rivalries on the cusp of their joint victory” (Brown 2013, 81).  
In the buildup to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki three weeks later, 
President Roosevelt revealed the bomb’s success to the leaders of ally countries, 
including Joseph Stalin. Truman hoped to see “fear or new respect on the Soviet leader’s 
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face” (Brown 2013, 81). Stalin, however, remained unvexed. He had known about the 
Manhattan Project since 1942. At the moment of the reveal, Stalin had teams of 
researchers scouting locations for the first Soviet plutonium plant. In the spring of 1945, 
Soviet agents covertly obtained the Smyth Report, the official history of the Manhattan 
Project and blueprint for the Soviet atomic project. Four years later, the Soviet Union 
tested their first nuclear weapon, an event that Moscow propagandists welcomed as the 
“peaceful atom.” “Soviet citizens believed their bomb was not a weapon of destruction 
but a ‘nuclear shield’ against capitalist aggression” (Brown 2013, 133).  
When Bohr posited that the “sheer might” of the bomb would create an “open 
world,” he likely didn’t consider the development of the Internet, but ostensibly this was 
the case. Despite some scholars’ assertions that ARPANET was not developed to 
decentralize communication to missile silos in the event of a nuclear war, the myth is 
rooted in truth. The early networking research at ARPA was funded in the post-WWII 
scientific community detailed in Bush’s Science: The Endless Frontier alongside 
Kennedy’s call for science in the New Frontier.  
Whether he liked it or not, which he didn’t, Bush was the architect for the military 
industrial complex. “Today, everyone thinks these terrific innovations came from the 
minds of bright kids, but they don’t realize that these kids needed an environment to be in. 
It came from Bush. He said, ‘Give these people money, let them play, and they’ll come 
up with something,” wrote Bush biographer Zachary Pascal. To examine ARPANET, it’s 
important to understand the Bush’s influences on the post-WWII scientific community, 
Bush’s conceptions for the funding science with federal money, and the rhetoric he used 
in Science: The Endless Frontier.  
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When World War II ended, the OSDR was “an unclean thing” despite its 
technological successes (Reingold 1987, 234). It had to go. In reconfiguring the U.S. 
economy and society from fighting a total war to a peaceful body, the federal government 
needed to find a new place for the science and scientists that arguably helped win the war. 
With the military branches engorged with resources and personnel, branch commanders 
hardly wanted to downsize and definitely didn’t want to stop the science that created 
radar, napalm, proximity fuses, and the atomic bomb. During the war, OSDR had nearly 
complete control over basic and applied science research in the United States.  
Defense contractors on the largest wartime projects found themselves awash in 
nearly unlimited government funding. Similarly, traditionally underfunded departments 
in universities used their skillsets to do the ‘big science’ that only governments might be 
able to bankroll. Often they did both, teaming contractors and first-class academic 
institutions to set the top minds on important war-related technology research. At its peak, 
the OSRD employed more than 6,000 scientists who worked with the military in a client-
like capacity. Though Bush was distrustful of contractors and politicians, he recognized 
their role in the wartime OSDR machine. However, with the end of the war, the OSDR 
needed to split its research divisions and turn them over to new management. The newly 
created Atomic Energy Commission and Naval Research Laboratory took over further 
development of nuclear assets, and other weapons programs transferred to defense 
contractors and military research agencies. Bush welcomed the dismantling of the OSDR, 
primarily seeing it as a necessary political and structural opening for massive reform of 
publicly funded basic and applied scientific research (Reingold 1987). Bush advocated 
strongly for increased funding for small-scale university research programs, reformed 
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university curricula in math, science, and medicine, reduced interference in scientific 
policy by politicians, establishing a lead scientist role in government autonomous of 
Congress and the President, and the creation of the lead scientist’s organization, the 
National Science Foundation. In 1945, Vannevar Bush, in his perfunctory role as the 
nation’s first scientific advisor to the president, submitted to the executive office a 252-
page Science: The Endless Frontier, which mapped out the peacetime mission and 
structure of the federally funded scientific community.  
Bush was concerned that science and innovation would decline after the war if the 
government cut funding to universities. “Only the federal government had the money to 
pay the bill for world-class research,” wrote Bush (Zachary 1997, 218). Bush had three 
main goals for the post-war scientific community: guarantee adequate funding for basic 
and applied research, improve the quality of the military’s research, and apply scientific 
expertise in the areas of education, research, and military. Central to this vision was an 
independently appointed chairman for the National Science Foundation who would only 
be accountable to a panel of scientists on the National Science Board. He envisioned an 
apolitical, scientific governing body as the only ones capable of directing federal research 
funds, which he wrote into his recommendations. Unfortunately, “Truman would not 
approve an organization whose director he could not hire or fire,” believing the position 
to be unconstitutional.  
Informed by the organizational and operational success of the Office of Science 
and Research Development, Bush’s recommendations for the post-WWII scientific 
community embraced knowledge as a source for American freedom and innovation. In 
Science: The Endless Frontier, Bush develops a mythological America where knowledge 
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was the source for freedom, and science and technology was the implement to extract 
knowledge from the physical and social worlds. Scientists and engineers would be the 
heroes for the new generation. In The Endless Frontier, Bush uses process-oriented 
rhetoric lifted directly from Turner’s Frontier Thesis. 
Directly referencing the Homestead Act of 1862, Bush (1945) equates federal 
funding for scientific research as necessary and productive, furnishing “land for pioneers” 
in the “opening of new frontiers” (8). The wartime OSDR opened science as a wilderness 
and the National Science Foundation was the successive frontier. With the successive 
metaphorical frontier come values associated with the advance of American science. Just 
as Turner’s frontier heroes attain their values from living near the wilderness, scientists 
similarly attain their values. In claiming that scientists and engineers are heroes, he’s 
saying that their values are associated with their interaction with the “scientific 
wilderness.” Rather than rugged individualism, the new pioneer heroes prescribe to a 
value system of community, openness, and collaboration. Bush continues in the report 
that “it is in keeping with the American tradition – one which had made the United States 
great – that new frontiers shall be made accessible for development by all American 
citizens” (11). Most importantly, scientists, not politicians, would win Bush’s frontier. 
The Senate passed the National Science Foundation Act of 1947, but Truman 
vetoed the bill claiming that its administrators were not appropriately responsible to 
Congress or the President (Zachary 1997). Bush considered the constitutional objection 
bogus, pointing to the administration of NASA as a functioning example of an expert at 
the reigns of a research agency. “Truman’s vote destroyed Bush’s hope that a research 
foundation would soon replace the military as the chief patron of academic science” 
	  
	  
 40 
(Zachary 1997, 333). Without a successor organization, Congress ceased funding to the 
OSRD in 1947 and its projects were split between the Office of Naval Research and the 
Atomic Energy Commission. With the dismantling of the parent organization of the 
Manhattan Project, the AEC assumed control over the Project’s facilities, marking the 
birth of the National Laboratory system and a new structure for basic science in the 
United States. Largely relegated in their research roles, the military took substantial 
control over orphaned research funding.  
After five more years of wrangling in Congress, Truman signed the law creating 
the National Science Foundation. Bush’s endless frontier, however, was ended as infinite 
only for the lobbyists. The OSDR was a war-borne behemoth intended only to last as 
long as the war. Science: The Endless Frontier intended to separate military from science, 
and science from politics. The result: a marriage of science, military, and corporations 
forged in law. Though Bush’s initial idea was not fully initiated, to this day “hardly a 
word is written about science policy today without making reference to Bush and his 
report” (Ceccarelli 2013, 41). Bush’s frontier left science to the scientists while calling on 
industry to create the technology that would assist the scientists. In the end, the military-
academia-industrial complex became the status quo for research and development in the 
United States. The Manhattan Project didn’t necessarily stem from a particular instance 
of frontier rhetoric, but it greatly informed the structure and goals of the post-WWII 
scientific community as envisioned in the Science: The Endless Frontier.  
When Turner looked at the 1890 Census Report, he notes the “uneven advance of 
the farmer’s frontier, with tongues of settlement pushed forward” (Turner 2013, 12). In 
addition to the fertility of certain regions and ease of travel along geological features such 
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as rivers and valleys, he also mentions the frontier army post. “The frontier army post, 
serving to protect the settlers from Indians, has also acted as a wedge to open the Indian 
country, and has been a nucleus of settlement” (Turner 2013, 13). Federal land still plays 
a large role in the “frontier of science,” and the frontier metaphor played a significant role 
in the creation of the federal lands used for military and science.  
Starting as early as the mid-nineteenth century with calls by Romantic poet Henry 
David Thoreau to protect the wild places, and fully enflamed by the 1890s, the use of 
America’s massive tracts of public land created a schism in national discourse (R. Nash 
2001). On one side, led by the famous naturalist John Muir and the Sierra Club, the 
preservationists advocated for reserves of land unaltered by man. On the other side, 
conservationists called for planned development of resources. “Juxtaposing the needs of 
civilization with the spiritual and aesthetic value of wilderness, the conservation issue 
extended the old dialogue between pioneers and Romantics” (R. Nash 2001, 129). Teddy 
Roosevelt pulled heavily from the frontier myth and its values in supporting the 
conservation movement that eventually led to legislation that established the nation’s first 
federal wildlife refuge, five national parks, and eighteen national monuments (Dorsey 
1995). Facing this major divide in public opinion and needing broad public support to 
drive legislation through an uncooperative Congress, Roosevelt’s rhetoric from 1901 to 
1909 balanced saving scenic areas of the country with industrial interests to harvest 
minerals, lumber, and energy, and preservation. In order to serve his political purposes, 
Roosevelt altered the traditional Frontier Myth in three ways: replacing the traditional 
“violent and exploitative” pioneer with the “farmer-hero,” redefining the unlimited 
frontier to a finite environment, and revised individual progress as resulting from 
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community rather than individual efforts (Dorsey 1995, 3). In his rhetoric, the 
characteristics of the hero changed. Unlimited space implies conquest (Jordan 2003), but 
finite, cherished land requires defense. Thus, the narrative changed from the destructive 
actions of the traditionally lone, industrious frontiersman to the collective effort to 
cherish and protect something finite. The resulting legislation resulted in the 
authorization of $80 million for the reclamation of three million acres of land. Though a 
relatively small authorization in funds, equivalent to approximately $2 billion 2014 
dollars, Roosevelt’s work toward conservation resulted directly in the establishment of 
the U.S. Forestry Service as it exists today, which manages 193 million acres of federally 
owned land. While Roosevelt did not create the National Park Service, he enacted the 
Antiquities Act of 1906, the original authority for about a quarter of the 401 areas 
comprising the national park system, which encompasses 84 million acres. Less than 
forty years later, in the face of a total war, the U.S. government overtook land under 
eminent domain and fair-value purchases for military and research installations.  
The rhetoric of Science: The Endless Frontier lends itself to a successive Western 
frontier, manifesting itself as massive consolidation of Western land for large-scale 
federal science projects during and after the war. Science served to subsidize the Western 
states. “Before 1940 many westerners believed that economic opportunities in the West 
had come to an end. President Roosevelt himself in 1935 had expressed the belief that the 
frontier had ceased to exist and that further growth in the West was unlikely” (Nash 1999, 
54). Hanford Site, near Richland, Washington, was the location for the first industrial-
scale plutonium plant in the world. At its peak as an “Atomic Frontier” site, the Tricities 
area near Richland, Washington, boasted 60,000 people. In the nuclear weapon build up 
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of the Cold War, the communities surrounding the Hanford Plant boasted 60,000 people 
in a city built completely by the U.S. government to attract top engineers and managers. 
Even after it closed in the 1990s, Hanford still employs 25,000 people in the area to clean 
up the largest nuclear wasteland in the country.  The Department of Energy expects to 
spend $100 billion on the site in the next ten years. Sandia National Laboratory in 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, developed, tested, and tested the non-nuclear parts of the 
nuclear weapon. White Sands Missile range is still the largest military installation in the 
United States, encompassing 3,600 square miles of New Mexico desert, and employing 
3,000 people in the otherwise industrial region. These are only the facilities directly 
linked to the Manhattan Project, not the hundreds of military installations that serve as 
the economic basis for local communities in the West.  
Similarly, geography dictated the location of the Hanford Site. The site and 
natural features were as much a part of the machinery of the plant as the reactors. 
Manhattan Project engineers selected the Hanford Site, near Richland, Washington, for 
its geographic features, isolation from major urban centers, and proximity to abundant 
electricity. Not many places fit the stringent criteria for a massive, secret facility, but 
General Groves found his perfect site in Washington. Only occupied by 2,000 people, the 
670-square-mile site was isolated and easy to clear of people. Once the owners of 
unproductive farms were evicted, the area was safe in case of accident and also secret. 
The barren location was windy, which engineers initially thought would allow dispersal 
of airborne radioactive material across a wide enough area to be harmless (Brown 2013). 
Located beside the Columbia River, engineers believed the river would appropriately 
dilute and disperse radioactive waste generated by the plant. River water used to cool the 
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reactor flowed into the reactor at the rate of 40,000 gallons per day, exiting the apparatus 
into a cooling pond that fed back into the Columbia River (Brown 2013). For abundant 
electricity, Hanford came out of another larger, earlier federal project – the Columbia 
River Basin project and the Grand Coulee Dam hydroelectric generation station. In this 
way, the landscape became part of the plant’s machinery. In the time of urgent wartime 
need, Manhattan Project managers selected the site based on unsubstantiated assumptions 
and once the river and atmosphere became part of the production process, the natural 
features would be part of the machinery of the plant until the need was fulfilled. The 
West’s ecosystem, however, could not fully dilute the wastes created while producing the 
material for nuclear weapons, creating a larger issue as the population density around the 
plant increased. “Even if the West had been truly empty, however, federal bomb making 
would have made sure that it did not stay that way, because nuclear weapons facilities 
accelerated the urbanization and the industrialization of the region” (Findlay 2011, 3899).  
Roosevelt’s legislation created the cherished national park system – and also 
supported the conservation movement. With its abundance of cheap land and open space, 
the West was ideal for the large-scale technology and research projects of the 1940s. 
Much of the space was federally owned, so the government either transferred the land to 
science or purchased the land cheaply from farmers and ranchers. The West is an analog 
to the government creating a new platform for communication and commerce.  
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CHAPTER IV 
THE TECHNOLOGICAL WAR OF THE NEW FRONTIER 
The Frontier Myth is absent from the early history of the Internet despite its 
development and growth in the post-WWII scientific community championed by Bush’s 
Endless Frontier, directly linked to Cold War military weapons system, and informed by 
the Kennedy administration’s New Frontier. The highly technical and research-related 
quality of ARPANET neither wanted nor required the public’s support; therefore, 
stakeholders had no use for the Frontier Myth. ARPANET engineers and policy makers 
didn’t create the so-called frontier. They opened up a metaphorical wilderness in the 
endless frontier of science. Internal rhetoric surrounding ARPANET emphasized “new 
territories,” indicating a neutralized space for potential commercial or military internal 
use. This chapter is premised on the idea that the New Frontier rhetoric opened up new 
funding for scientific research in the United States. In this chapter I’ll show how 
collaborative engineers in a small field created a resilient, survivable network for the 
military and then instilled the system with their own collaborative values.  
On July 15, 1960, John F. Kennedy addressed the Democratic National 
Convention as the party’s nominee for the presidential race. Before the 20,000 people at 
the Denver Convention Center, he introduced the narrative for his presidential campaign, 
presidency, and the direction of the nation.  
We stand today on the edge of a New Frontier — the frontier of 1960s, the 
frontier of unknown opportunities and perils, the frontier of unfilled hopes and 
unfilled threats. ... Beyond that frontier are uncharted areas of science and space, 
unsolved problems of peace and war, unconquered problems of ignorance and 
prejudice, unanswered questions of poverty and surplus (Kennedy 1960). 
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On May 25, 1961, John F. Kennedy stood before Congress as president and asked 
the nation to make its largest peacetime commitment of national resources to a single 
technological feat – the first manned mission to the moon, and the breakthrough into the 
“new frontier.” In establishing the groundwork to access his “New Frontier,” Kennedy 
invoked a deeply engrained American nationalism tied to images symbolic of 
overcoming obstacles and conquering the unknown with tenacity, technology, and 
spirited individualism – familiar heroes of the pioneer era, navigation terms associated 
with Westward expansion, and even Manifest Destiny itself.  
As the Cold War raged in technological one-upmanship, Kennedy announced his 
moonshot plan in the “Special Message to the Congress on Urgent Needs” on May 25, 
1961. In this address to Congress, Kennedy returns to the original Frontier Thesis 
archetypal heroes, while also altering the universe and narrative to encourage public 
support for his space initiative. First, Kennedy shifted the frontier from the infinite to the 
finite, Kennedy bought the moon within tangible grasp using familiar navigation terms 
and spatial progressions, which “enabled Kennedy to dismiss questions about practically 
of the mission as being contrary to our national character” (Jordan 2003, 216). Evincing a 
brand of Manifest Destiny, Kennedy also manipulated time toward inevitability, urgency, 
and perseverance. Though the Russians already minorly occupied space, America would 
over a decade make it to the moon.  
Kennedy crafted a public role in the exploration of space, “creating a perspective 
in which the audience could see themselves as the next in a long line of pioneers” (Jordan 
2003, 210). Ultimately, the heroes in Kennedy’s moonshot speech were the astronauts 
who would physically travel the “vast stretches” of space, the scientists who would 
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provide the solutions and completion to innovations that were “unanswered and 
unfinished” (Jordan 2003, 212). Kennedy’s rhetoric not only created a new frontier for 
the public, but also a participatory experience on the national road to the moon landing. 
In response to the presidential request and public support, Congress authorized the largest 
commitment of resources to a single technological feat ever made– $33.4 billion from 
1959 to 1969 including $26 billion for research and development (Ezell 1988, 8–10).  
Kennedy linked the frontier to a process already underway. In 1958, President 
Eisenhower requested a $520 million appropriation from Congress and a $2 billion 
budget plan for the Advanced Research Project Agency to direct “all U.S. space 
programs and all advanced strategic missile research” (Hafner and Lyon 1998, 20). 
Congress approved the funding five days after Eisenhower appointed Roy Johnson, vice 
president of General Electric, to the helm. ARPA was set to contribute to the core of 
American global power – delivery systems for nuclear weapons, smaller bombs with 
higher yields, and nuclear early warning systems, but only for a short time. Hastily 
founded as an “interim space agency” in the aftermath of the 1957 Sputnik launch, ARPA 
served as holding tank for civilian and military assets. (Edwards 1997). In 1958, 
Eisenhower signed into law the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
stripping ARPA of its space mission and leaving the fledgling agency with a fraction of 
its original budget. Facing failure before launch, ARPA repositioned itself as the federal 
space for high-risk, high-gain research. They intended to distance themselves from the 
Pentagon, push near-term goals, and tap top-tier research universities for talent. In short, 
ARPA’s strategy was to always swing for the fences and do so conforming to Bush’s 
original conception of the scientific community. As enacted, the policies derived from 
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Bush’s Endless Frontier ultimately placed too much power over science policy in the 
hands of politicians. ARPA was an enclave for researchers to manage big science without 
much oversight from the Pentagon. The new organization was ideally suited to the 
atmospheric change in Washington that came with Kennedy’s administration and the 
New Frontier – a frontier that would need computing power to fulfill its goals.  
Kennedy’s political motives manifested as funding for computing. Within ARPA, 
computing fell to the laboratory of Command and Control Research.  Then as now 
command and control warfare comprised military tactics that use technology and 
techniques to deceive the enemy, jam enemy transmission, and ensure efficient, reliable 
communication for friendly troops. Most importantly, the military wanted to replace 
human skill for computing power. The Cold War was a conflict that employed high 
technology weapons systems that were beyond a human’s ability to control without 
computers. Interpreted from the military point of view, Licklider’s 1960 paper “Man-
Human Symbiosis” meant computers aiming and operating advanced weapons, solving 
difficult problems in weapons engineering, and calculating increasingly complicated 
operational war-game scenarios. In the immediate postwar years, federal research funds 
for computer development primarily came from military agencies. Kenneth Flamm 
estimates that the federal government funded 80 to 85 percent of computer research in 
1950 (Edwards 1997). It might seem that as long as the military funded computer 
research, they could dictate the values associated with the technology. Though it might be 
true that researchers contributed to General Westmoreland’s “electronic battlefield, in 
other cases, researchers hijacked the programs, instilling them with their own values.  
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Licklider became the first director of ARPA’s Command and Control Research 
laboratory in October 1962, shifting the focus of the program that would eventually carry 
out his vision for computing. He was offered the position after he published his 
foundational paper and became known for his work on psychoacoustics and human-
computer interactions for the Air Force. When Licklider took the reins, the office had a 
$5 million budget in addition to a single $9 million contract with System Development 
Corporation for the IBM-built AN/FSQ-32 computer – a prototype mainframe computer 
intended to power a system of radar sites to control NORAD response to a Soviet air 
strike. Immediately, Licklider reached out to computer scientists at Stanford, MIT, 
UCLA, Berkeley, and SDC allocating research dollars into time- and resource-sharing, 
operating systems, artificial intelligence, and computer graphics. He also changed the 
name of the laboratory to the Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO), 
representing a shift from ambitious, yet impractical military tasks, to a value-based 
mission closer to his vision of man-computer symbiosis. 
In the 1960s, a problem still existed within the collection of ARPA-owned 
computers that they were custom-built to specific tasks. Without standardization, each 
computer relied on a unique programming language. Across the ARPA-funded collection 
of computers, researchers were duplicating and isolating computing resources. If a 
scientist needed to solve a problem, he would need to physically travel to the computer 
and work with a programmer to run their computation. The problem was as much 
geographic as technological. At a series of computer seminars at the Pentagon in 1962, 
Licklider ardently pitched time-sharing as a solution. Each computer purchased by the 
government should be accessible over a network, he said, so that one computer may serve 
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many different users. His first year as IPTO director, Licklider funded a $2 million time-
sharing project at MIT called Project MAC where 30 users could simultaneously share a 
mainframe computer. MAC stood for Man and Computer, Machine-Aided Cognition, or 
Multi-Access Computing, depending on the individual’s preferred backronym. 
“Licklider’s goal was not simply to develop time-sharing but also to develop a 
community of researchers who would make the new machine a central part of their 
investigations” (“Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) | United States 
Government” 2015). He also famously wrote a series of memos in support of a global 
computer network, calling it the “Intergalactic Computer Network,” which would 
facilitate military goals and also collaboration among a community of researchers. 
Computers networked to the eventual ARPANET could reach out to resources in other 
computers, reflecting the collaborative community of scientists.  
New ideas about command systems emerged independently from different 
agencies within the military-industrial complex. The RAND Corporation established 
itself after the war as a leading defense contractor researching tactics and operations, 
essentially privatizing functions the OSDR developed during the war (Hafner and Lyon 
1998, 55). The U.S. Army Air Forces established Project RAND in 1945 to plan the long-
term future of weapons systems. Two years later, RAND Corporation split from its parent 
company Douglas Aircraft Company to become an independent, non-profit research 
organization. In the 1950s, RAND Corporation found their place in systems analysis 
research for artificial intelligence, space systems and war-gaming. In the 1960s, RAND 
engineer Paul Baran significantly contributed two main ideas to the theories of network 
survivability that would serve as the framework for the Internet. Primarily motivated by 
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the tensions between the U.S. and Soviet Union, Baran developed an interest in the 
survivability of essential communication systems for the President to initiate a retaliatory 
nuclear attack. Baran’s findings at RAND showed the U.S. long-distance 
telecommunication system was particularly vulnerable to failure in the event of an attack 
solely based on its centralized network configuration. Baran envisioned a network as an 
interconnected set of nodes, each having the ability to send and receive data. He cites 
three types of networks, listed in order of vulnerability. When diagramed, centralized 
networks look like the spokes in a bicycle wheel where all outer connections meet at a 
center node. If the central point fails, then communication fails for all perimeter points. 
Decentralized networks operate linking the hub of centralized networks to one another. If 
the links between spokes breaks, then it would partition the network. Finally, distributed 
networks most closely resemble a fishnet with many interconnected neighboring nodes. If 
one or more nodes fail in a distributed network, transmissions can be rerouted around the 
failure in any open direction. Telephone networks have always been configured either as 
centralized or decentralized networks. All telephony networks route users through local 
central switching points that relay the signal long transmission lines to another local 
switching point and finally to the other user, with several relays in between. In the event 
of a nuclear strike or other outage, failure of main switching points could hobble the 
entire network because there were no redundancies. Baran concluded that wartime 
communication systems should employ three to four redundancies to develop sufficient 
reliability and ruggedness. In the event of a nuclear strike, pathways would still exist in a 
distributed network. His second idea was to break apart the message into smaller pieces 
for transmission.  At the time, user-to-user long distance connections kept all the circuits 
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open for the duration of the call. Rather than establishing and maintaining a dedicated 
pathway, Baran’s message would separate into “blocks.” These separate blocks would be 
uniform in size, take different routes from origin to destination, and allow a constant flow 
of data from many different sources to enter the transmission line at the same time. 
Hafner and Lyon use the example of transporting a house from Boston to Los Angeles. 
Engineers could potentially load the entire house onto the back of a truck in one piece, 
but with great difficulty. Instead, they would most likely dissemble the house, label the 
pieces to indicate their location in the overall structure, and load the pieces onto trucks. 
Not every truck would necessarily take the same cross-country route as they reroute for 
efficiency, bad traffic, or adverse weather, but once all the pieces arrive engineers could 
reassemble the structure on its new lot in California. Conceptually, Baran said the same 
thing could be done with information. A computer could break the message into pieces, 
label each individual section according to its order in the whole message, and transmit 
them through the quickest available route. Each switching node would have a routing 
table that indicated the best route to take, constantly updating with information about 
neighboring nodes, distances, and delays. Also known as dynamic routing, Baran called 
the scheme “hot potato routing.” If the best path were busy or missing, then the table 
would reroute to the next best route, or even send the block back to the originating node. 
At the receiving end, another computer would look at the labels and reassemble the 
message in the correct order.  
In 1965, after failing to convince AT&T its system was vulnerable to attack, 
Baran sent a formal recommendation to the Air Force to develop an experimental 
network: “The need for a survivable … flexible, user-to-user communications system is 
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of overriding importance” (Hafner and Lyon 1998, 64). Despite the Air Force agreeing to 
fund the network, AT&T still refused to build or maintain the system. Not to be 
dissuaded, the Pentagon ventured to build the network with the newly formed Defense 
Communication Agency at the helm rather the Air Force, but Baran moved to halt the 
work. “It would have been a damn waste of government money and set things back. The 
DCA would screw it up and then no else would be allowed to try, given the failed attempt 
on the books” (Hafner and Lyon 1998, 64). Determined to wait for the right agency to 
undertake the project, Baran shelved his message-blocking concept around the same time 
British physicist Donald Davies at the National Physical Laboratory floated a similar idea 
to the British Post Office for their telephony network. He, too, faced stiff opposition from 
the telephone monopoly. 
In 1965, Davies wrote a series of personal notes to colleagues about splitting 
messages into uniform data “packets” after observing MIT’s Project MAC time-sharing 
system (Hafner and Lyon 1998). The word packet in itself was a deliberate metaphor 
representing a small package. “I thought it was important to have a new word for one for 
the short pieces of data which traveled separately” (Hafner and Lyon 1998, 67). After 
asking two linguists whether there were cognates in other languages, he fixed the term 
“packet switching.” The phrase was much more palatable than Baran’s “distributed 
adaptive message block switching” idea, but the two essentially meant the same thing. 
Only one primary difference separated their research. Davies focused on configuring the 
packets to overcome differences in computer language, hardware, and software. He 
envisioned a global network of computers connected by intermediary computers. 
ARPA’s principal investigators would independently come to the same conclusion after a 
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1967 meeting in Ann Arbor, Michigan – a watershed moment in the history of computing 
that provided researchers to develop the experimental network with a set of values that 
mirrored their community. 
Though Licklider left ARPA within two years of arriving, he built a highly 
qualified computer science team with vision for the future of interactive computing, and 
the promise for continued funding. Ivan Sutherland succeeded Licklider, but then left 
after only a few months later, leaving for a position at Harvard. Computer scientist Bob 
Taylor moved from the deputy position at IPTO to become the lab’s third director in 
1966. Having moved from NASA to work with Licklider, Taylor followed the doctrine of 
“Man-Human Symbiosis,” instating the values of collaboration into the network 
experiment he would devise and fund. ARPA director Charles Herzfeld was renowned 
for easily funding project, so much so that a joke among project directors was: “Come up 
with a good idea for a research program and it will take you about 30 minutes to get it 
funded” (Hafner and Lyon 1998, 41). With the floodgates of New Frontier funding open 
and in the spirit of the Endless Frontier, Herzfeld funded the experimental network, but 
finding a project manager proved difficult for Taylor. In some cases, researchers were 
happy working at their respective institutions. In other cases, researchers simply didn’t 
want to be part of defense research, even though much of computing research was funded 
by the Department of Defense. Taylor immediately pursued MIT Lincoln Lab scientist 
Larry Roberts, promising not only sufficient funding for the project, but also the 
directorship of IPTO when he left. Roberts, however, employed both techniques for 
rejecting the offer, insisting he liked his work in Boston and also didn’t want to become a 
Washington bureaucrat. After three visits to Boston and a year of rejection, Taylor found 
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out that more than half of Lincoln Lab’s funding came from ARPA. Approaching ARPA 
director Herzfeld, Taylor asked him to call the Lincoln Lab director and inform him that 
the on-going support of the lab would be conditional on with Larry Roberts heading the 
ARPANET project. Three weeks later, Roberts joined ARPA from Lincoln Lab in 1966 
to headed to Washington.  
As Kennedy linked the American scientific frontier to facing down “the single-
minded advance of the Communist system,” Taylor networked computers to face down 
researchers who each wanted their own computer. Following Licklider’s time-sharing 
philosophy, Taylor saw computers isolated in labs across country as a waste of money 
and resources. Though Licklider’s philosophy manifested with in the community as a 
zeal for elevating computers beyond the role of expensive calculators, researchers still 
viewed time-sharing as depleting already-thin resources. Many researchers did not 
initially embrace the idea, which was evident in a meeting at the University of Michigan 
in Ann Arbor in 1967 to layout the networking experiment. Speed, reliability and 
mapping were among the main issues discussed at that meeting. Each researcher turned 
complaints into value-laden requirements for the network. The scientists agreed that 
extant time-sharing systems were excruciatingly slow and notoriously unreliable with 
transmitting data. They noted that the network should have a fast response time, agreeing 
on a basic benchmark of half a second. The researchers were frustrated with failed 
attempts at transmitting data as circuits closed and dumped the connection, but the 
telephone system was ill suited for sustained long connections. Taylor proposed using 
modems to network the computers. Research led by Roberts in 1966 linked his computer 
at Lincoln Lab with the SD Q-32 in Santa Monica, but the crude modems, referred to as 
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“automatic dialers” operated at 2,000 bits per second and required special four-wire 
Western Union lines. They obviously needed another solution, so Taylor suggested 
programming each host computer to both perform computations and also communicate 
with the network. He did not find a warm reception to this idea. Programming the 
computers to talk to the network tied up already-limited computing power. Though the 
group of researchers outlined their requirements for the experimental network, the 
question still remained: How would they get computers programmed in different 
languages to talk to one another? Each computer operated with a custom programming 
language. Without a common language, they faced a difficult problem. At the meeting 
cybernetics expert Wes Clark passed a note to Taylor that read, “Your network is inside 
out.” (Hafner and Lyon 1998). After the meeting in the car on the way to the airport, 
Clark, Roberts, Taylor, and a couple other researchers sketched out a system that left the 
host computers out of network communication entirely. Clark proposed a subnet where a 
small computer would communication with the network, leaving the host computers’ 
computing power in tact. The subnet would comprise the smaller computers rather than 
the host computer. Most importantly, programmers would only have to write code to talk 
to the subnet rather than every computer on the network – the exact idea Davies proposed. 
The ARPA team eventually became aware of Davies’ packet-switching research at 
another meeting later that year, and through it also found Baran’s research. Later, during 
the design of ARPANET, Davies visited Roberts, finding that his paper “had been used 
so much that its pages were falling apart” (Hafner and Lyon 1998, 77).  
These meetings are indicative of the collaborative, information environment of 
ARPA in the 1960s. As Kennedy’s New Frontier stepped up funding for command and 
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control measures with computers played a central role. For this reason, Edwards claims in 
Closed World that ARPA precisely demonstrates how military research problems could 
shape a scientist’s intellectual interests. Licklider and his colleagues were working on a 
problem contextualized by “command and control in electronically mediated, partially 
automated, eventually computerized systems” (Edwards 1997, 268). Even as the 
Kennedy rhetoric implied values of self-reliance and rugged individualism would lead to 
American expansion into the unknown, ARPANET was created informally and fashioned 
to embody the values of the scientists. Janet Abbate in Inventing the Internet points out 
that IPTO managers encouraged contractors to work together as peers, and colleagues to 
share skills and insights as equals. “Having been researchers themselves, they subscribed 
to the view that the best way to get results in basic research was to find talented people 
and give them room to work as they saw fit” (Abbate 2000, 55). Even as Taylor solicited 
opinions about the experimental network from researchers in Ann Arbor, the men around 
the table debated rationally as peers. Just as the Manhattan Project scientists would spend 
their Sundays climbing Lake Peak and talked about physics problems in the sunlight, the 
ARPA researchers shared ideas and sketched out plans for the network traveling to 
meetings, late into the night at bars, and, in the case of Licklider and his best friend 
UCLA researcher Leonard Kleinrock, while playing roulette and blackjack in casinos. 
“Layering and a decentralized, collegial approach to management came to be seen by 
members and observers of the project as essential characteristics of the ARPANET, and 
were later held up as models for successful project development” (Abbate 2000, 51). In 
effect, ARPA reincarnated the wartime OSDR, and the IPTO operated as an independent 
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organization led by a small directorate of researchers with minimal oversight from the 
military. 
By 1968, Taylor funded the first node of the experimental network at four sites – 
UCLA, Stanford Research Institute, University of Utah, and University of California-
Santa Barbara. Each site was selected for a unique characteristic. UCLA and UCSB 
already had internal networks. Utah researchers provided interactive graphics. ARPA 
principals selected SRI because Douglas Engelbart worked there. ARPA would install an 
Interface Message Processor at each of the four locations and lease 56-kbs telephone 
lines to connect them, forming the core of the experimental network. Roberts was the 
network’s principal architect, establishing the guiding principles. Chief among these 
requirements was reliability, which meant the IMPs needed to operate independent of the 
host computers. If host computers or even individual IMPs were down for service, the 
subnetwork needed to continue functioning. As Robert wrote the thick requests for 
proposal, he assembled a small team to galvanize the technical requirements for the 
network footbridges, recruiting RAND’s Paul Baran to advise the group. The IMP 
hardware and software proposal was novel. Unlike other projects, which operated on 
personal connections and the director’s knowledge of contractor expertise, Roberts sent 
request for proposals to 140 companies.  
The unique capabilities of the IMPs might have encouraged Roberts to cast a wide 
net for proposals, but he eventually ended up granting the contracts to a company with 
close personal connections. Roberts contracted Bolt, Beranek, and Newman (BBN) to 
build the IMPs. The company was small, but had significant, important personal ties to 
the IPTO already. Licklider worked at BBN before leading the IPTO. Roberts also knew 
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BBN researcher Robert Kahn from early meetings about the ARPANET. Other contracts 
were even less formal. Roberts hired UCLA scientist Leonard Kleinrock, a fellow MIT 
graduate to analyze the network systems. Kleinrock already received ARPA to support 
several graduate students, including Stephen Crocker, Vinton Cerf, and Jon Postel – three 
eventual Internet pioneers in their own rights. Based on Roberts’ relationship with 
Engelbart, Stanford Research Institute received a contract to create the collaborative 
Network Information Center (NIC), which would serve as the online resource for 
network personnel and documents. Finally, Roberts also established the Network 
Working Group (NWG), an informal community of software researchers who were 
developing protocol specifications for the host computers. In sum, contracts were largely 
awarded due to personal social connection to ARPA directors. In September of 1969, 
BBN installed the first IMP at UCLA. Within three months, the four-node network went 
online connecting UCLA, SRI, UC Santa Barbara, and Utah. By the end of 1971, 
ARPANET had 15 nodes. In the decade between 1973 and 1983, ARPANET underwent 
a number of upgrades, including sequestering military nodes into their own network, 
switching its packet-switching protocol to TCP/IP, and forming a larger network of 
civilian and military networks called the Internet.  
Like the atomic bomb, the Internet was born from the marriage of military and 
science. ARPANET was built at the height of the Vietnam War and funded by the Cold 
War for military customers in a science community built during World War II, yet IPTO 
managers emphasized research rather than military objectives. Congress and the 
Pentagon expected to see deliverable from their liberal funding despite that fact that 
ARPA at its heart was an agency founded to perform basic, rather than applied, research. 
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The network was constructed in an environment with ideological pressures exerting 
pressures both from the top-down and bottom-up. Engineers built into the networking 
technology values advantageous to the military such as survivability, flexibility, and high 
performance over commercial goals such as low cost, simplicity, or consumer appeal 
(Abbate 2000). At the heart of the Internet was control, but researchers as a culture were 
distinctly open and collaborative – a value they built into the network. ARPA managers 
were integral to allowing researchers to build the network sewn with these values, 
shielding them from political pressures in Congress and the Pentagon. The directorate of 
researchers at the head of ARPA was careful to frame the agency’s research in terms of 
military application despite rarely asking for defense rationale. “Many of the IPTO’s 
computer science projects were proposed by the researchers themselves, or were designed 
to allow researchers to continue work in areas they had explored independently” (Abbate 
2000, 77). Often the military application came after the fact even when individual 
elements were military hardware. In the 1960s, Baran’s distributed network was a 
solution for the telecommunication network to survive a nuclear attack. The IPTO was 
founded to develop command and control software for a nuclear defense shield against a 
Soviet nuclear attack. Later, IPTO and ARPA directors pitched ARPANET as an efficient 
cost-savings tool at various times during its development. Wes Clark viewed IPTO 
contracts as always having a loosely defined military objective, but they served as 
suggestive rather than necessary. Compared to sister organizations like the National 
Science Foundation, ARPA had nearly no oversight from Congress. In 1965, the 
Department of Defense funded 23 percent of university science in the United States; the 
National Science Foundation funded nearly 13 percent (Abbate 2000). The NSF, however, 
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underwent great scrutiny from Congress. Taylor posited that Congress saw ARPA’s 
research as part of a whole rather than an “in toto a research organization” (Abbate 2000, 
75).  
Though Vannevar Bush promoted the NSF as the center of federal research, the 
organization was heavily politicized as the National Science Foundation Act of 1945 
made its way through Congress. Truman initially vetoed the bill because he felt an 
organization without oversight was unconstitutional. He wanted scientists to serve as a 
specialist role rather than administrative. As Zachary Pascal put it, “he wanted experts on 
tap, but not on top” (Zachary 1997, 333). Bush saw politicians controlling scientific 
research as the second worst possible scenario. The worst possible scenario was research 
falling solely into the hands of the military. Bush spent most of his postwar career 
grappling research functions away from military officers that he subsumed with the 
OSDR. In his role as chairman of the postwar Research and Development Board, Bush 
spent two years in a turf battle with the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Each service had 
overlapping research projects that Bush attempted to bring under the roof of the RDB. 
“Bush tried in vain to enforce his will on the recalcitrant Joint Chiefs. [Secretary of 
Defense James] Forrestal backed Bush’s bid to unify the military’s research program but 
organizational defects and parochial attitudes checked his progress” (Zachary 1997, 337). 
Just ten years later, ARPA was founded; the organization structured after Bush’s 
successful Office of Science and Research Development. ARPA was deeply embedded in 
the Department of Defense with its central office in the Pentagon and the program 
directors equivalent to the rank of brigadier generals. There’s a certain irony that Bush’s 
Endless Frontier was eventually realized in the C-ring of the Pentagon.  
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 In the first chapter, I looked at the consolidation of Western land for large-scale 
wartime science projects and Teddy Roosevelt’s defense of public land with frontier 
rhetoric. During World War II, science was performed in the West – and the land rush 
continued into the Cold War. Federal spending in the West after World War II created a 
second land rush while stimulating and even creating local economies. In the cold war 
years, the Department of Defense, NASA, and the Atomic Energy Commission spent 15 
percent of the national budget. Between 1961 and 1965, NASA contracts to Western 
states totaled $5.3 billion – or nearly half of NASA expenditures. Science and defense 
became inexorably linked. “More than 90 percent of federal research and development 
contracts and half of its science grants were awarded by defense agencies” (G. D. Nash 
1999, 96). Among the Western states, California boasted more research and development 
contracts than any other state. After WWII, dozens of research and development 
installations for weapons projects sprouted from the federal landscape of the West. Los 
Alamos and Sandia National Laboratory campuses built post-war occupy more than 
30,000 acres in New Mexico, with 20,000 staff members and a combined budget of $5 
billion. Rocky Flats in Denver manufactured triggers for nuclear weapons from 1952 
until 1992, creating and also destroying a local economy.  
 Gerald Nash’s overview of federal defense spending between 1945 and 1965 
shows that a quarter of military and civilian employees lived in thirteen western states (G. 
D. Nash 1999). “Thus, after World War II and its aftermath saw the formation of the 
scientific-industrial-military complex that remains arguably one of the most powerful 
economic sectors in the United States” (Kuletz 1998, 42). After World War II, dozens of 
research and development installations set their roots in the Western states because the 
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land was either cheap or federally owned. When Manhattan Project manager Leslie 
Groves and Oppenheimer looked west for their bomb-making locations, they saw empty 
space. By the Cold War era, the West was an enclave for high-tech companies that 
produced missiles, computers, and electronics. The West became the place where 
research and development was performed. In the 1950s, federal dollars filtered into 
California, Washington, Kansas, Utah, Colorado, and New Mexico through technology 
contracts. Environmental historian Gerald Nash points out that in the 1960s Austin 
attracted companies like IBM, Advanced Micro Devices, Intel, and Motorola. 
California’s Silicon Valley is still home to many high-tech corporations – in part due to 
defense funding in the universities and industry. Kennedy’s New Frontier grew out of the 
fertile post-war scientific community envisioned by Vannevar Bush in Science: The 
Endless Frontier.  
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CHAPTER V 
THE FRONTIER OF CYBERSPACE 
In the last three chapters, I’ve looked at the Internet as a phenomenon developed 
as successive invocations of the rhetorical frontier. The first frontier, Vannevar Bush’s 
Endless Frontier of science institutionalized the funding structure for science research in 
the United States, the military-industrial-academic complex. The second frontier, 
Kennedy’s New Frontier once again enlisted scientists and engineers as frontier heroes. 
To face down the Soviet Union the New Frontier administration sent a deluge of funding 
into the institutional pipes laid out by the Endless Frontier. The military-industrial 
complex swelled with the fresh money for space exploration, advanced weapons systems, 
and command and control infrastructure. Advanced Research Project Agency was 
uniquely suited to develop functional prototypes of theoretical engineering concepts 
because it was well funded, underwent little Congressional oversight and attracted top-
tier scientists. The third frontier moves away from the infrastructure of the Internet to the 
content. In the 1990s, the Internet expanded beyond the community of computer 
scientists to the general public. The Internet became a metonym for the content and all 
online activity. In this chapter, I’ll show how the values associated with the popularized 
Internet in the 1990s reflected the collaborative environment of the ARPA engineers.  
This chapter is premised on the idea that the Internet was portrayed rhetorically 
both as a wilderness and a frontier in the 1990s and 2000s. When invoking the Frontier 
Thesis, there’s always a wilderness that’s conquered by a frontier hero. In the successive 
wave of development that follows the frontier hero, the frontier opens civilization. 
Frederick Jackson Turner instilled the wilderness, frontier, and frontier heroes with 
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values that find their way into almost every subsequent invocation. These images and 
values frame the Internet as the electronic frontier. I’ll first show an example of a 
physical analog for the Internet as a frontier. One particular community exemplifies 
Internet values – the Burning Man festival. Second, I’ll show the Internet treated in 
public discourse as both a Romantic and pre-Romantic wilderness according to their 
respective values I discussed in chapter 2. As the Internet developed, however, some 
parts preserved the “savage,” relentless pre-Romantic notions of the wilderness. Third, 
I’ll demonstrate how the frontier metaphor changed in the 1990s to defend the Internet as 
finite resource – both as a frontier and the wilderness. By tracing the mission the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, foreign government’s to limit freedoms, and rise of 
monolithic Internet companies, I’ll show first how the Internet might still be expansive, 
but certain operational values required defense. Finally, geography is as important in the 
decade of the Internet’s popularization of the Internet as any other point in time.  
Each year since 1986 thousands of people have gathered on a remote, dry lake 
about 100 miles north of Reno for a weeklong celebration of self-expression called 
Burning Man. In 1996, event founder Larry Harvey’s opening speech to the 8,000 
attendees called the desert gathering “a compelling physical analog for cyberspace.” The 
comparisons are striking in many ways. Burning Man began as a summer solstice fire 
party on Baker Beach in San Francisco in the early 1980s. By 1986 the Baker Beach 
parties drew too many people for Harvey to secure permits, so he moved the event to the 
Black Rock desert in Nevada. Since then Burners, as the participants are called, 
congregate in the desert each year, creating a temporary city in the desert – and then they 
leave a week later without a trace. Burning Man’s tenants urge its citizens to live 
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authentically with complete self-expression and self-reliance. “It is, like cyberspace, a 
frontier in which individuals can exercise remarkable freedoms. Our desert world and the 
blank expanse of its playa form a decontextualized arena of action” (Clippinger and 
Bollier 2014). Harvey and his cadre provided the space, and the Burners built everything 
else: themed-communities, massive art projects, and “mutant cars” – vehicles modified to 
look like pirate ships, dragons, or mermaids. While the event has always been self-
organized, until 1997, the event was completely unorganized and only partially 
decontextualized. Harvey was right. He created a frontier where people could experience 
life without governance or guidelines, but individuals embracing their total freedom 
brought their own ethos.  
The new venue away from civilization in the center of 318,000 acres of desert 
brought an anarchist element, which the community initially tolerated, but not necessarily 
condoned. Although Burning Man was not necessarily founded on anarchist principles, 
Harvey recalls: “We were not in any a subculture, but this new group brought with it an 
underground ethos” (Clippinger and Bollier 2014). It was an “anything goes” ethos. 
People sped through the desert in their cars at 100 miles per hour with their lights off. 
Burners lived up to their moniker. They built structures and then ignited them with 
flamethrowers. Just days after Harvey compared Burning Man to cyberspace, a 
motorcycle crash killed one man and a speeding vehicle ran over two tents in the middle 
of the night, injuring its occupants. Harvey realized it was time to invent a government, a 
de facto state for the gathering along with a value system. He and the other organizers 
decided to eliminate firearms and regulate traffic. They even gave everyone an address 
within a unique street grid – a semi-circle with the eponymous giant Man structure at the 
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center. As the temporary city took shape, the founders instilled with the architecture of 
the city itself values that supplanted the tacit underground ethos. Burning Man co-
founder Rod Garrett wrote: “Our goal was to express and abet a sense of communal 
belonging, and establish population densities that would lead to social interactions. 
Concurrently, we were attempting to recreate some of the intimacy of our original 
camping circle, but on a much larger civic scale” (Clippinger and Bollier 2014). The 
semi-circle was a metaphor for the campfire origin myth and also provided utility. For 
Burners to find their way back to their camp, they only needed to remember the 
alphabetized ring of their site within one of the concentric circle and its location on a 
clock-like dial (for instance, 10:30, C). Following the disasters of the 1996 Burning Man, 
founders brought ordered society. Order followed the ordered streets. The 1997 reforms 
angered anarchists, but they too could participate within the boundaries of the new phase 
of Burning Man – as long as they followed the new rules.  
Harvey galvanized Burning Man’s tenets in the “Ten Principles of Burning Man,” 
further instilling the festival with values for participation, individualism, and commerce. 
The Ten Principles were the Burning Man’s Frontier Thesis. Four of the principles 
compel the individual: radical self-expression, radical self-reliance, immediacy, and 
participation. Four are guidelines for the community: communal effort, civic engagement, 
radical inclusion, and Leave No Trace. Finally, two create Burning Man’s gift economy: 
gifting and decommodification. With these principles Harvey dictated the norms, 
narrative, and universe for their desert utopia. Physically, Burning Man rises out of the 
desert from nothing each year. “Within a desert wilderness we build a city, a model world 
composed of people who attend our event from all over the globe” (Clippinger and 
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Bollier 2014). Burners build everything besides the architecture for the city. He changed 
the universe from an anarchist encampment to the playa – a term meaning “beach” in 
Spanish that Burners use for the desert location. Geography is important. The narrative 
outlines a utopia where gift giving supplants bartering and commerce, and self-reliance 
paradoxically rises to the supreme tenant within the communal gathering. Just as 
Frederick Jackson Turner developed a set of desirable values that lead American settlers 
into the frontier experience, Larry Harvey first facilitated a city in the desert and then 
built into it value-laden principles for its denizens. His metaphor brings to light key 
comparisons between the development of the Internet and the Web. 
When Harvey compared the gathering to the structure, rate of growth, and 
community. In comparing cyberspace he pointed to the multi-ethnic community the event 
draws and self-reliant themed villages built from nothing. Furthering the analogy, I’ll also 
point out that the Black Desert is federal land managed by the Bureau of Land 
Management. The central authority only dictates principles for how to live rather 
enforcing them. As Peter Hirshberg points out, Burning Man’s “core directions are set by 
a small team of founders who curate and exercise their judgment more as Plato’s 
philosopher-king than as leaders of a democratic state” (Clippinger and Bollier 2014, 
951). The tenant of radial participation means the community also radically self-polices 
the values. If the concentric circles of road system are the Internet, then the themed 
villages are the Web – the content layer of the infrastructure. The “Ten Principles” are the 
instructions for acceptable behavior. Individuals conform to certain self-policed 
regulations while participating both on the Web and at the festival. Though the principles 
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challenge any control, they primarily mean outside control from corporations, 
government, or society.  
One of the often unspoken tenants of the Frontier Thesis is the temporary state of 
the space between wilderness and civilization. The frontier eventually became 
civilization. The archetypal pioneers invoked deep cultural myths about the American 
national character, but they’re only useful in the initial stages of colonization. As the 
trope goes, the restless pioneer moves on as he sees the smoke of other fires behind him – 
or when there is no place else to go. Normalization follows the frontier, which means 
establishing law and order, building fences, and rounding up outlaws. Though it appears 
that Burners found an institutional crack where they could thrive as autonomous 
individuals, Harvey’s tenants served to standardize the individual within the community. 
Burning Man, indeed, was a physical analog for the frontier, particularly because it was 
addressed in the final year for the gathering’s frontier phase.  
Just as conceptions of the American West range from the idyllic frontier where 
settlers could escape the dense urban areas to the location of holocaust for Native 
American, cyberspace shines as fertile territory for commerce and also a haven for child 
pornographers, gambling, and hate groups. The rhetorical wilderness is elastic. One 
person’s wilderness is another’s frontier. Some groups defend privacy and anonymity as 
a necessary part of the frontier condition. Some individuals are simply afraid of the 
Internet. A 2000 Pew Internet and American Life study found that among non-users more 
than half think the Internet is dangerous (Lenhart 2000). Other groups view privacy and 
anonymity as the conditions that make the Internet a tool for tyrants and den for 
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miscreants. If the “surface web” is the civilized Internet, then the Deep Web has been 
described as the outlaw counterpart, the wilderness in the pre-Romantic sense.  
Describing the entirety of Web content inaccessible to search engines, the Deep 
Web remains a misnomer. More accurately, the network of web “hidden services” hosted 
on the Deep Web, which are accessible only with an anonymizing “onion router” – of 
which the best known is the Tor Browser Bundle (TBB). The Deep Web drew significant 
media attention in October 2013 when federal investigators closed the online marketplace 
Silk Road, known as a major black market for drugs and other illicit items. Wholly 
transacted in the anonymous cryptocurrency Bitcoin, Silk Road reportedly generated $1.2 
billion in sales during its two years of operation, making it the most successful black 
market on the anonymous webspace, but not the only one. The Silk Road was made 
possible because of its anonymity. Services like the Silk Road are called hidden services. 
Hosted hidden services include web content similar to “surface web” content such as 
marketplaces, forums, websites, and blogs, except they’re only accessible from an onion 
routing browser. Onion routing browsers relay web traffic through a series of separately 
encrypted proxies (called onion routers) “that reroute messages in an unpredictable path” 
(Bergman 2001, 276). The TBB bounces users’ web traffic to a network of relays around 
the world, preventing sites from learning their physical locations, blocking cookies and 
other data-mining software, and allowing dedicated access to regular websites and also a 
special network of encrypted forums, marketplaces, and webpages. Recent criminal 
investigations into blackmarkets and child pornography rings that operate on Tor hidden 
services has driven public discourse and political rhetoric toward labeling the network as 
a den for perverts and criminals, but many other type of users who want to entirely 
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conceal their identity also use onion routing, including dissidents, whistleblowers, and 
journalists.  
Interestingly, Tor originated as an ARPA-funded Navy project in 1998 (ARPA 
was changed to the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency in 1990). According to 
DARPA’s Information Innovation Office, NRL and SRI International continue to 
develop the Tor network with funding from the agency’s Safer Warfighting 
Communications (SAFER) program. The stated goal of SAFER is to “develop 
technology to enable safer, resilient communications over the Internet, particularly in 
situations in which third parties attempt to discover the identity or location of the end 
users” (Walker 2014). Among the organization Tor website thanks for continued 
financial and non-financial support are National Science Foundation, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, Google (“Tor Project: Overview,” n.d.). Despite the illegal uses associated 
with Tor hidden services, the U.S. government funded the network to usurp Internet 
censorship in totalitarian countries. In the Cold War, the CIA smuggled photocopiers into 
the USSR for dissidents to use to create and distribute pamphlets to fellow 
revolutionaries. The Navy developed the Tor network to secure government 
communications. The Tor Project promotes Tor as a means for dissidents and journalists 
circumnavigate government controls.  
Evgeny Morozov illustrates the dark side of Internet freedom in The Net Delusion 
(2011). The Belarusian scholar and writer points to the uses of technology by 
governments and corporations to stifle social change and personal freedoms. Morozov 
dedicates an entire chapter comparing the vernacular and tactics of the modern day 
political wars to Cold War rhetoric, drawing heavily from Hilary Clinton’s speech about 
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Internet freedom from the steps of the Newseum in Washington, D.C., on the anniversary 
of the fall of the Soviet Union in 2010: “The Berlin Wall symbolized a world divided and 
it defined an era … the new iconic infrastructure of our age is the Internet. Instead of 
division, it stands for connection. But even as networks spread around the globe, virtual 
walls are cropping up in place of visual walls” (Clinton 2010). For American 
policymakers, successfully promoting Internet freedom carries with the same pitfalls of 
freedom of speech. The same freedom of speech that protects the pro-government activist 
provides the same protections to the separatist. Promoting Internet freedom is not 
synonymous with furthering democracy.  
Morozov claims that foreign politicians see the control panel as an American 
machine to spread American political agenda, but found out how to rewire it for their 
own purposes – with shocking “sophistication in the online world” (29). In 2008, the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard launched 10,000 blogs to counteract the secular blogs in 
advance of the election, artificially inflating pro-Ahmadinejad sentiment online and 
drowning out the opposition (135). After the Green Movement, the Iranian government 
collected the hundreds of photos of protests and the protestors posted onto Facebook and 
Twitter, and used them to find the dissenters. They posted the user-generated images 
online and broadcasted them on public television asking for the identities of faces circled 
on the photos. They realized the power of social media and often checked Iranian 
citizens’ Facebook accounts at border crossing for connections with revolutionaries. With 
the interconnectedness online, Russia’s KGB traced individuals’ online connections and 
built social maps to triangulate potential dissenters’ groups. In both these instances, tech-
savvy governments turned the user-generated, public information back onto the 
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revolutionaries. Morovoz laundry listed dozens of such offenses. In their efforts to 
maintain the status quo, the governments surveil their populations and engineer media 
environments. 
 The pre-Romantic wilderness also extends to other “dark qualities” about the 
nature of the Internet including the effects of anonymity and deindividuation. Early 
studies into anonymity and deindividuation theory arose from the quality and morality of 
citizen-generated letters to the editor in daily newspapers. Saks and Ostrom (1973) found 
that unsigned letters were more likely to include themes from which they feared reprisal. 
Other pre-Internet studies showed that anonymity increased aggressive behavior 
(Zimbardo 1969) and encouraged suicidal individuals to follow through with their 
attempts (Mann 1981), which are issues as prevalent in the contemporary online realm. 
Spears and Lea (1994) put deindividuation theory to work within a mediated environment 
with their social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE). When applied to 
anonymous, online environments SIDE shouldn’t necessarily be classified as mob 
mentality; however, individuals experience the same loss of self-identity and no longer 
fear retribution for breaking social norms. Internet-era cases of deindividuation include 
cyberbullying and encouraging suicides. In 2008, 19-year-old Abraham Biggs posted a 
suicide note to a message board along with the recipe for the “drug cocktail he intended 
to consume” (Stelter 2008). Strangers on the forum reportedly encouraged him to take the 
drugs and then watched online as he died. Closing the New York Times article, University 
of Southern California communications professor Jeffrey Cole said, “The anonymous 
nature of these communities only emboldens the meanness and callousness of the people 
on these sites” (Stelter 2008, para. 23). Nash points out that when pioneers got too close 
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to the “savage” wilderness, they too became savage. If the hidden Tor services are the 
Wild West, then Facebook and other large walled gardens are the settled territories.  
John Gilmore, one of the founders of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, coined 
the familiar Internet trope: “The Net sees censorship as damage and routes around it.” In 
that same article, Time reporter Philip Elmer-Dewitt writes: “There are no TV guides to 
sort through the 5,000 discussion groups or the 2,500 electronic newsletters or the tens of 
thousands of computer with files to share” (Elmer-DeWitt and Jackson 1993). He 
compared new Internet users to mariners floating “adrift in a borderless sea” (1993). 
Engineering librarian Glee Willis said of the Internet, “it’s a family place. It’s a place for 
perverts. It’s everything rolled into one.” The modern Internet is much different in some 
ways, but the same in others.  
 Internet search engines provide the “TV guide” to sort through the estimated 
1.97 billion indexed websites (de Kunder 2014). Google is the juggernaut in the search 
engine arena, proclaiming itself as the place to search for information on the Internet, 
which latest market share data confirm. In January 2014 comScore, the most widely 
accepted measure of Web search engine competition, released its monthly qSearch 
analytics data showing Google powering 68.9 percent of the 19.6 billion worldwide 
Internet searches (Lella 2014). The engine’s advanced algorithm blends website 
characteristics such as keyword relevance, and site and page quality with personal 
information it collects from users such as their geographic region, web history, and 
personal content from other Google services (“How Search Works” 2014). As a condition 
of using their search engine, users grant Google permission to track their searches and 
sell sponsored links to the highest bidder for specific keyword searches. According to the 
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company’s FY2013 annual investor report, they sold $3.5 billion worth of advertising to 
appear beside search results (Duncan 2014). 
Communities formed on the Web from the earliest days of USENET newsgroups. 
Rising monolithic in the Internet landscape are “walled gardens,” or closed ecosystems 
where companies control the digital environment in which their users shop, commune, 
search, or interact. With 1.2 billion active users, Facebook is the largest walled garden. 
As a condition of using the service, users grant Facebook permission to use their personal 
information in advertising. Even outside the walls of the proprietary online communities, 
web browsers store cookies from websites, which record and send data back to the 
company about the users’ previous activities.  As Internet users become increasingly 
aware of the technological means by which companies and government organizations 
monitor and track web traffic, they are more likely to conceal their online activity 
through the use of advanced privacy settings and anonymizing software. Whether 
installing an ad blocker on their browser or employing the use software that masks their 
Internet Protocol (IP) address, the Pew Internet and American Life Study reports that 86 
percent of Internet users attempted to mask their online behavior or avoid being tracked 
(Rainie et al. 2013). Approximately half the Internet users polled said “they were worried 
about the amount of personal information about them that is online – a figure that has 
jumped from 33 percent who expressed such a worry in 2009” (5).  
The final line of the Time article “First Nation in Cyberspace” states: “While it 
may be difficult for communities as diverse as those on the internet to set their own 
agenda, it seems increasingly likely that if they don’t, someone else will do it for them” 
(Elmer-DeWitt and Jackson 1993). In 1996, founding member of the Electronic Frontier 
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Foundation John Perry Barlow wrote “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” 
set an initial agenda for the virtual world. In the opening line of the sixteen-paragraph 
treatise, Barlow wrote: “Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh 
and steel, I am from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask 
you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no 
sovereignty where we gather” (1996). Written as a response to the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996, which deregulated the telecommunications industry, Barlow demarcates 
cyberspace as a region outside the boundaries of a single nation – or any nation – to 
control. In 1993, John Farber jested that: “We ought to apply to the U.N. as the first 
nation in cyberspace” (Elmer-DeWitt and Jackson 1993). But if that happened, Facebook 
and its 2 billion users would probably be a new global superpower. The EFF still fights 
against the government, but recently turned toward industry. “While early threats to our 
right to communicate came from the government, current threats come also from 
industry, as it seeks to control and expand current revenue sources at the expense of 
traditional fair use” (“A History of Protecting Freedom Where Law and Technology 
Collide” 2015).    
As these companies grew while monetizing user information, the call for Internet 
defense grew louder. Rather than defending the Internet as a frontier with limitless 
resources, organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation called for defense of a 
value system. When Teddy Roosevelt invoked the Frontier Thesis, he replaced the 
traditional pioneer with the “farmer-hero,” redefined the unlimited frontier to a finite 
environment, and emphasized community rather than individual efforts (Dorsey 1995, 3). 
Roosevelt’s rhetoric from 1901 to 1909 was specifically developed to combat industrial 
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interests to harvest minerals, lumber, and energy in the Western states. According to 
Dorsey, when Roosevelt came to office, one-half of the country’s timber had been cut, 
wasteful mining operations poisoned entire ecosystems, and profit-minded hunters nearly 
wiped out once-abundant species. In his “First Annual Message,” conservation of natural 
resources represented “the most vital internal questions of the United States” (Dorsey 
1995, 6). In order for the new myth to redefine the lessons of the foundational myth, the 
speaker must approach it in a non-threatening way. Just as Roosevelt believed the 
resources would eventually run out, rhetoric defending the electronic frontier reinforces 
the values associated with the ARPA researchers while creating a narrative that they 
needed defense.  
He specifically points to the United States, Singapore, China, Russia, and Italy as 
opponents to Internet freedom, though he’s missing a big point. The place he claims to 
speak from a place outside control; however, he spoke from the frontier, not the 
wilderness. Ten years prior, Barlow’s cyberspace was significantly smaller and accessible 
only to government scientists and the military. In the fall of 1985, the Internet was still 
just university researchers and comprised about 200 computers. Four years later, the 
number had grown to 159,000 (Abbate 2000). Applications like USENET connected 
users in newsgroups, though the most common applications were email and file sharing. 
In 1990, ARPA turned the infrastructure of the nascent Internet over to the National 
Science Foundation’s Computer Science Division. In a watershed moment of Internet 
history, the NSF opened access to the public. No single corporation could control access 
to the Internet, but the 1990s were a veritable land rush for the new dotcom companies. 
Within a few short years, America Online (1991), Amazon (1995), Ebay (1995), 
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Wikipedia (2001), and Facebook (2004) pioneered a new industry on the endless frontier 
of cyberspace, bringing with them new challenges for the network society. The Internet 
might not be limitless, but the values associated with the electronic frontier are seen as 
endangered. Unlimited space implies conquest, but finite, cherished land requires defense. 
Thus, the Internet frontier narrative changed from lauding the actions of the industrious 
technologists to the collective effort to cherish and protect something finite – Internet 
freedom.  
The Internet of the 1990s was also geographic for a number of reasons. First, the 
liberty afforded to individuals was dependent on access to the Internet. Second, the 
limitless frontier of cyberspace actually has an upward limit on its size in a few 
dimensions. In the second decade of the popularized Internet, the world nearly ran out of 
IP addresses. I’ll also show that U.S. institutions controlled and maintained the Internet 
for the first 20 years of its existence with some implications.  
The Digital Divide is the disparity between the people who have and do not have 
access to the Internet in the United States. The values associated with the Internet might 
make it a place for unlimited prosperity and opportunity, but you have to have a computer, 
Internet connection, and know how to use them. In the 1980s, without a usable graphic 
user interface (GUI), scientists and researchers relied on programming languages to 
control their digital computers. Even Vannevar Bush, an early inventor of analog 
computers, found that software and programming language was beyond his abilities. 
Environmental historian Roderick Nash points out that the idea behind the “safety valve” 
theory might have been successive to Jeffersonian agrarianism, but it didn’t work. The 
land might have been free, but the start-up costs were beyond the average low-income 
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American. Immigrants had a better chance to settle the Western states because they 
weren’t tethered to a particular city. The reality is that like the actual frontier, a certain 
amount of capital and know-how was required to homestead the new space. The 
invention of the user-friendly operating system, personal computer, and World Wide 
Web brought the collaborative Web environment closer to rural and urban Americans, 
but not close enough.  
In 2000, the Pew Internet Research Center published a report called “Who’s not 
online” from 1998 surveys (Lenhart). The report notes significantly less Internet 
penetration in rural areas, noting that 57 percent of respondents in rural areas did not have 
access to the Internet. Geography plays a role in Internet access, but the digital divide 
also describes individuals in socioeconomic status who do not have Internet access. The 
Pew study found the same to be true, finding that just 31 percent of individuals who live 
in households earning less than $30,000 annually have access. The first obvious step is to 
get a computer into the home and then show value for Internet access.  
The Digital Divide extends beyond the geographic and socioeconomic conditions 
in the United States – it’s also a global issue that’s drawn attention from the United 
Nations and other international rights organizations. Organizations like U.S.-based 
Internet Corporation for Assigning Names and Numbers (ICANN) don’t regulate Web 
content, but they maintain considerable influence over the infrastructure of the Internet. 
Created in 1998, ICANN is a private, non-profit corporation contracted by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce to manage the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS) and 
assign domain names. More importantly, it also runs the Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA), which allocates IP addresses to Regional Internet Registries (RIR), 
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which in turn assigns them to the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in their respective 
countries. 
ICANN provided reliable maintenance of Internet infrastructure to a global 
community for more than 20 years, particularly the development and allocation of IP 
addresses for net-connected devices. Stanford computer scientists Vint Cerf and Bob 
Kahn developed the experimental IPv4 for a small ARPANET system in the 1970s. For 
this experiment, they used a 32-bit address, which provided a seemingly adequate supply 
of 4.3 billion addresses. However, a growing Internet quickly exhausted the available 
space in the protocol.  
In the 2000s, IANI managed the growing address depletion crisis, gradually 
shifting to allocation policies “that require ever-stronger justification for additional 
space” (Klensin 2002). As the protocol filled up, developed countries received the 
majority of the free space. In the system of priority, each country must justify its 
allocation. A glance at the IP address allocation by country, African countries comprise 
the 20 nations the lowest IP addresses per 1,000 citizens (Allocation of IP Addresses by 
Country 2014). The United States, Sweden, and Norway have the highest IP addresses 
per 1,000 citizens. The United States, China, and Japan are allocated the highest number 
of total IP addresses, followed by the United Kingdom, Germany, and South Korea. This 
cursory glance shows a geographic and socioeconomic disparity in allocated IP addresses. 
IPv6 changes that dynamic, but IP modernization comes slowly for the developed 
countries – and slower for the underdeveloped. 
In 2012, ICANN launched a long-awaited expansion of Internet protocol from 32-
bit addresses to 128-bit addresses, which, according to Cerf, will provide about as many 
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IP addresses as “there are electrons in the universe” (Dr. Vint Cerf on “Reinventing the 
Internet” 2013). IPv6 will solve many of the issues pointed out by Pickard about IPv4, 
particularly the appropriate allocation of IP addresses to developing and third-world 
countries. The allocation of IP addresses only remains a problem as long as the system 
runs on IPv4. As of 2013, 96 percent of the Internet still runs on IPv4 because Internet 
Service Providers refuse to transition (Dr. Vint Cerf on “Reinventing the Internet” 2013). 
As a global, soon-to-be multi-stakeholder governing body, ICANN doesn’t have the same 
North-South implications as the transnational corporations that control the hardware and 
software. Unfortunately, the transition relies upon the major ISPs to implement their 
protocol, and even then IPv6 won’t reverse the long-standing social and cultural issues of 
globalization or modernization in a network society. 
As we saw in chapter two, the wilderness is as important to the frontier condition 
as civilization. Romantics idealized a space between the sublime wilderness and 
oppressive civilization. Industrial interests viewed wilderness as the useless, “savage” 
land extending west of the edge of American civilization. In the metaphor of the Internet, 
the ARPA researchers created the wilderness when a space solely reserved for 
collaborative scientific research opened to public, allowing limitless economic prosperity 
for anyone who settled it. The Internet of the 1990s and 2000s was partly a frontier and 
also a wilderness – it just depends on the location of the universe, hero, and narrative. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
A frontier is ideological rather than physical. A frontier is a myth, metaphor, and 
descriptor. In some cases, frontier imagery is a benign descriptor attached to a pastoral 
aesthetic. When deployed in political rhetoric, the semantic value of the word “frontier” 
remains remarkably consistent with the active national narrative of U.S. expansion. With 
each new discovery or new place, the people identified as “pioneers” in their respective 
areas of study or conquest, scratch out a new frontier from the wilderness. In their 
constitutive rhetoric, the mythmaker draws from cultural images that embody a specific 
set of values commonly associated with the myth of the American west – and the origin 
of the American character. There are those who claim the Internet is still a place of 
limitless possibility and democracy. There are also those who claim the Internet should 
be regulated. There are others who say both should happen. Both sides often rhetorically 
treat the Internet as a frontier, whether in spirit or metaphorically by invoking imagery 
from the myth of the American frontier. In doing so, new mythmakers introduce the same 
ideological problems of the American frontier into a digital space.  
Like other frontiers, the Internet emerged as a free, open space and its 
metaphorical closure comes with censorship and exclusion of privileges by regulation, 
but treating the frontier as a discreet place rather than an ideological process is 
problematic. Pioneers and policy create frontiers from wilderness. Rhetoric from 
protesters and the regulators equally engage the frontier metaphor either explicitly or 
while defending the values commonly associated with the Internet as the electronic 
frontier. In this concluding this thesis, I’ll discuss the problematic defenses of the Open 
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Internet in its infrastructure and content. First, I’ll demonstrate the continuation of 
American expansionism in the Internet infrastructure governance. Second, I will examine 
recent protests against content regulation.  
In the past three chapters, I’ve shown politicians use the myth of the American 
frontier to promote expansion, protection, and competition. Each new mythmaker slightly 
changed the narrative, universe, and hero of the foundational myth in metaphor. In 1906, 
Teddy Roosevelt invoked frontier imagery to protect the remaining undeveloped lands of 
the Western states by rhetorically creating a cherished space. The resulting legislation 
resulted in the authorization of $80 million for the reclamation of three million acres of 
land, which eventually led to the establishment of the U.S. Forest Service and later the 
National Park Service. In 1945, Vannevar Bush expanded the frontier to the infinite to 
encourage further exploration (and conquest) of the scientific frontier. His 
recommendations marked the birth of the National Science Foundation, National 
Laboratory system, and military-industrial-complex. In 1960, John F. Kennedy 
announced a national commitment to breakthrough into the “new frontier” of space – 
$33.4 billion from 1959 to 1969 including $26 billion for research and development. 
From these three examples, we see the wilderness once as a cherished thing and twice as 
a place to conquer. In the first invocation, the wilderness was cherished because an 
unlimited resource became depleted and faced destruction. In the second and third 
invocations, the wilderness was unlimited and required conquest, but not defense. In the 
rhetoric of the Open Internet, the electronic frontier is unlimited and required defense. 
Thus, the defense of the Open Internet is defense of its operational feature – the promise 
of freedom in an open space.  
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Internet border disputes often arise at the crossroads of Internet freedom, 
economic realities, and government regulation. The National Science Foundation opened 
the Internet to commercial and public use in 1986, attaching legislation to ensure no 
single company could monopolize access. Internet service providers emerged in the late 
1980s. In 1991, Tim Berners-Lee created the first-ever website hosted on a server at 
CERN. Berners-Lee envisioned the web as a “neutral, creative and collaborative space,” 
reflecting the values of the Internet and the scientific community (Savov 2015). The rise 
of affordable, user-friendly personal computers and the invention of the Web spurred an 
online land-rush in the 1990s. From this innovation, two finite resources of the web 
needed regulation – domain names and IP addresses. In 1998, the Department of 
Commerce contracted the newly formed non-profit Internet Corporation for Assigning 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) to oversee and coordinate Internet infrastructure, allocate 
IP addresses, and administer domain names. Prior to ICANN’s incorporation, ARPA-
funded computer scientist Joe Postel administered top-level domains and IP addresses as 
a side task to his research. The Internet might not have a CEO or a board of directors, but 
ICANN and other technical regulatory bodies that determine standards and infrastructural 
designs do – and they’re all based in the United States.  
The frontier is a metaphor for American exceptionalism. Frederick Jackson 
Turner’s frontier distinguished the United States from its Europe roots. In later 
invocations, frontier rhetoric distinguishes the United States from the rest of the world. 
Though the Internet might seem to have no physical boundaries, root servers and IP 
addresses operate toward globalization. Manuel Castell (1996) claims that globalization 
finds its genesis in the rise of advanced telecommunication technologies. In the network 
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society, Castells points out that global communication networks flow among one other 
rather than a vertical-hierarchical infrastructure that dominated the modernized industrial 
world, which has an effect both on social structure and culture. “Technology is a 
fundamental dimension of social structure and social change” (Castells 1996, 18). While 
the network society might provide a certain amount of democracy, it also allows a 
division of labor between American corporations and developing countries – the center to 
the periphery in cognitive functions. It’s easy then to understand Schiller’s point of view 
when he writes: “the globalized system might not directly mean imperialism” (1991, 11)  
though it is propped up by transnational corporations. The information society is merely a 
technologically advanced industrial society that assimilated to the Western culture of 
modernization. Though organizations like International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) or the ICANN don’t often regulate content, their considerable influence over the 
infrastructure of the Internet means the democratic future of the platform remains quietly 
in their hands – at least for now. 
In March 2014, the U.S. Department of Commerce made an announcement long-
awaited by the international community: that it will relinquish control of ICANN “to 
support and enhance the multistakeholder model of policymaking and governance” 
(National Telecommunications & Information Administration 2014). Created in 1998, 
ICANN is a private, non-profit corporation contracted by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce to manage the Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS) and assign domain 
names. More importantly, it also runs the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), 
which allocates IP addresses to Regional Internet Registries (RIR), which in turn assigns 
them to the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in their respective countries. When the 
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government agency’s contract runs out in September 2015, ICANN will transition to a 
multi-stakeholder model. Under this model, ICANN will remain in technical control of 
the DNS and IP allocation, but its oversight will come from a global multi-stakeholder 
community rather than U.S. governmental agencies. Though attempts to globally 
democratize ICANN in the past have seen mixed results, it’s possible that the end of 
unilateral control by the United States has ended.  
Unraveling the rhetoric of the Open Internet provides insight into an unlimited 
space that faces depletion of the operational features instilled by its founding engineers – 
openness, neutrality, and freedom to collaborate. When functioning according to its 
ARPA-instilled values, the limitless frontier is seen as naturally democratic and open. 
When these values are threatened, the Open Internet comes cherished. In the early years 
of the Internet, the electronic frontier exhibited all the features of a Western boomtown – 
a place where anyone could find their fortune. As corporations and governments attempt 
to exert control, both netizens and Internet-based companies voice their concerns through 
online protests and hacktivism. Few things in Internet politics stir greater ire than 
regulating content.  
The first instance of mass protest happened in response to anti-piracy legislation. 
In January 2012, Internet technology companies and the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
staged a massive protest against H.R. 3261, Stop Online Privacy Act (SOPA), and S. 968, 
PROTECT IP Act (PIPA). If enacted into law, SOPA would hold search engines and 
websites legally responsible for linking to other websites that display copyright-
infringing content. PIPA primarily targeted international websites hosting content. The 
bills defined various techniques for copyright holders to disable blacklisted sites, 
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including blocking the DNS, and forcing third-party payment processors to discontinue 
service. While many protestors feared that lawful sites might be censored, the tech 
companies understood they would be required to police for copyright infringement and 
held legally responsible for infractions. During the daylong protest, Google blacked out 
its logo while collecting 7 million signatures on their online petition to “End piracy, not 
liberty” (“End Piracy, Not Liberty” 2014). Wikipedia diverted 162 million users to a 
splash page explaining the legal implications of the legislation. In all, more than 14,000 
websites participated in the protest. In response, Congress shelved the bills. While the 
organized protest was successful, other groups attempt to enact change to Internet 
regulation through hacktivism and whistleblowing. In instances like the 2012 Internet 
Blackout regulators develop the Internet universe as a place that shelters bad people – 
content pirates, child pornographers, terrorist organizations. Reverting to the pre-
Romantic notion of the Internet-as-wilderness, they find a frightening place that requires 
control.  
This thesis contextualizes the development of the Internet in both a rhetorical and 
regionalist perspective. In the histories of the Manhattan Project, Information Processing 
Technology Office (IPTO), and Electronic Frontier Foundation, the frontier metaphor is 
largely absent. It’s clear that the engineers don’t think of themselves as heroes. Rhetoric 
and culture, however, idolized these individuals as archetypal heroes. They were exactly 
the men and women Vannevar Bush and Kennedy enlisted to take the wilderness and 
expand the American frontier.  
The Internet itself did not explode into existence in a single Big Bang. It also did 
not manifest solely as the Web. The origins of the Internet and the idea of the Internet 
	  
	  
 88 
manifest in the linkages of frontier rhetoric in the 1940s, 1960s, and the 1990s as 
persuasive metaphors. More important than its existence and current use is its early 
history, particularly when the conceptions of its use were formed. Control, not democracy, 
is inherent within the structure of the Internet. Early engineers and researchers made it 
democratic, reflecting their collaborative working conditions. It developed in a social 
environment of researchers and technicians over the course of decades in a variety of 
fields. Similarly, strong political speeches brought scientific research funds within grasp 
for new fields, like computer science and information sciences, while military 
requirements justified the funds. The politicians contribute the process-oriented history – 
the origin myth. The engineers occupy the place of discovery, grappling the meaning 
away from the organizations that funded their research and instilling the system with their 
own social values – collaboration and freedom of thought. The history of the Internet is 
as much a history of technology and policy as the struggle for meaning making. 
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